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Comment
Focus on management 
At the time of declaring their Exclusive Economic or Fishing Zones (EEZs/EFZs), the
developing countries were mainly concerned about utilizing the vastly underexploited
marine fishery resources. The general assumption was that resources were abundant
in nature. Marine fisheries were seen as an excellent source of employment, income,
food security and foreign exchange. In this process, the need for conservation and
management was overlooked. Except for protecting fisheries resources from blast
fishing, and fine-meshed nets, conservation and management was largely seen as a
problem of rich countries. 
The situation that prevails since the 1990s is vastly different from that of the 1970s and
1980s. Most of the commercially valuable stocks, especially in the inshore waters, are
now overfished. China and Chile, two of the largest fish producers in the world, are
going through a major crisis in their fisheries. More disturbing than the drop in
production are the unmistakable signs of biological and economic overfishing. The
composition of the catch is changing in favour of low-value, small-sized, species.
Considering the large resource base and the investment that has been made into the
industry in countries like Chile, Peru, India, China, Indonesia and the Philippines, it may
not at all be wise to leave the situation to sort itself out. Moreover, the livelihoods of
millions of  fishworkers depend on healthy fisheries. A joint initiative by the State with
the industry, fishing communities and other responsible national and international
agencies is required to turn the fishery around. This clearly underscores the importance
of moving from a largely laissez-faire fishery to a managed fishery with long-term goals
and plans. 
In general, the fisheries legislation in developing countries mainly target the fishing
vessel rather than the fishery per se. What seems to be essentially regulated is access
to fishery resources in time and space, that too in a lackadaisical manner. Conservation
and management should refer to all of the rules, regulations, conditions, methods, and
other measures, which are required to rebuild, restore, or maintain any fishery resource
and the marine environment as qualified by relevant economic and social factors. This
brings into the scope of conservation and management, not only the supply-side, but
also the demand-side of fisheries, especially international trade in fish and fish
products. 
The architecture of such a regime is already implicit in some of the recent national
legislation as well as in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS),
the UN Fish Stocks Agreement and the FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries.
Relevant measures are also needed to protect the marine environment from pollution.
So far, there are few measures to protect the territorial waters from land-based sources
of pollution. This lacuna has to be immediately addressed. 
Export-led development of a fishery, although it brings benefits in the short run, could
be ruinous in the long run, if there are no clear management plans, especially for entry
into, participation in, and exit from, the fishery. Unless the safety net of conservation
and management is put into place, any external stimulus to produce more fish will end
up in an economic, ecological and social catastrophe. Developing countries have to
move from a ‘development alone’ mode into a mode of  ‘development with
management’.  It is high time for this paradigm shift.
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Indigenous fisheries
Maori power
The Maori fisheries settlement is a world leader 
in terms of resource transfer to indigenous people
The management of fisheriesthrough the use of property rightsis often perceived as being
anathema to the recognition of indigenous
fishing rights. Experience in New Zealand
suggests that the opposite may, in fact, be
the case. Not only are indigenous fishing
rights compatible with a property rights
approach to fisheries management, such
an approach can be used to settle claims
involving indigenous fishing rights, to
preserve those rights for future
generations, and to integrate such rights
within a wider fisheries management
framework.  
Throughout the world, State management
of fisheries using regulatory instruments
has left indigenous communities subject
to the values and aspirations of the
dominant culture as represented by the
government of the day.  No matter how
liberal, democratic and egalitarian the
State may be, the final result is likely to
further erode the ability of indigenous
communities to manage, harvest, and use
natural resources in ways that are
consistent with their cultural needs.  A
property rights-based system can provide
a robust mechanism for ensuring the
sustainable utilization of fisheries, while
providing for indigenous rights holders to
realize their often divergent social and
economic aspirations.
Indigenous communities traditionally
have their own internal regulatory
mechanisms for management of their
fishing activity. Such regulatory
mechanisms are integral to the nature of
their fishing rights. 
Recognizing and providing for
indigenous and coastal community
fishing rights requires empowering the
communities concerned to use those
mechanisms, and integrating them within
the wider fisheries management
framework. In fully exploited,
multiple-user fisheries, a system based on
well-defined property rights allows the
rights of indigenous communities to be
recognized and provided for, relative to
the rights of other groups.
In New Zealand, the introduction of a
property rights system for fisheries not
only gave rise to the largest indigenous
rights claim in the country’s history, it also
provided the means for that claim to be
settled and for indigenous rights to be
recognized and provided for within the
wider legislative framework.  Maori
fishing rights have been recognized by a
combination of property rights
instruments, vested in tribal or sub-tribal
communities rather than individuals.  It is
up to those communities to decide how
they manage those rights.  
As the indigenous people of New
Zealand, Maori held customary fishing
rights under British common law. These
rights were guaranteed by the Treaty of
Waitangi, signed between the British
monarchy and Maori chiefs in 1840.
Customary fishing was exempted from
the rules and regulations in fisheries
legislation made after the signing of the
Treaty. However, the exact nature of these
rights was never defined. 
Slow negation
As a result, Maori fishing rights were
slowly negated by the egalitarian
principles of the dominant European
settler society—one law for all. The
statutory provisions protecting Maori
customary fishing rights were worthless,
unable to define the nature of those rights,
and then protect them from encroachment
by the activities of other fishers. The
Treaty of Waitangi was regarded as a legal
nullity by the courts until the 1980s.
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In the mid-1980s, the government inNew Zealand moved to introduce aquota management system based on
individual transferable quota (ITQ) for
major commercial fish stocks.  It was this
move to create an artificial property right
to take fish, and then allocate that right to
existing commercial fishers, that drove
Maori to seek an injunction against the
government, saying that their customary
fishing rights had not been taken into
account.  
The task of defining the nature of Maori
customary fishing rights then fell to the
courts. In an important test case in 1986, a
Maori individual was found not guilty of
taking undersized shellfish on the
grounds that he was exercising a
customary fishing right. He had fished in
accordance with customary practices by
obtaining permission from the kaitiaki, or
guardian, of the tangata whenua from the
area where the fishing occurred, and acted
in accordance with the instructions of the
kaitiaki.
The concept of tangata whenua, or ‘people
of the land’, is crucial to the definition of
Maori customary fishing rights. Tangata
whenua are the iwi (tribe) or hapu
(sub-tribe) that hold customary authority
over a particular area. Rather than being
general Maori rights, customary rights
belong to tangata whenua and can only be
exercised within their area. The full nature
and extent of customary fishing rights was
elucidated by the Waitangi Tribunal as a
result of extensive research into tribal
claims to fisheries. 
The Waitangi Tribunal is a permanent
commission of inquiry, set up in 1975 to
investigate claims regarding breaches of
the Treaty of Waitangi.  Maori customary
fishing rights were found to have both a
commercial and a non-commercial
component (based on evidence that Maori
were trading seafood widely, prior to the
signing of the Treaty of Waitangi). The
fisheries they exploited were extensive,
and the methods to catch fish were highly
advanced, compared to those of their
European counterparts. The Tribunal also
ascribed a developmental component to
the customary right, giving Maori a right
to a share of the deep-sea fisheries off the
coast of New Zealand, even if they were
not being fished at the time the Treaty was
signed.  
Customary rights
Most importantly, Maori customary
fishing rights pertained not only to the use
of fisheries, but also to the management of
the resource. While fishing practices
differed among the different tribes,
customary fisheries had always been
actively managed by kaitiaki.
Traditionally, fishing outside the rules set
by the kaitiaki could subject the fisher to
severe penalties. In 1986, the High Court
placed an injunction on the Crown,
preventing it from proceeding with the
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introduction of the quota management
system. The Court advised the Ministry of
Fisheries that the aims of the Crown in
introducing the quota system were
commendable. At the time, the Waitangi
Tribunal observed that the ITQ right had
much in common with the rights
guaranteed to Maori under the Treaty of
Waitangi—it guaranteed access, it was
perpetual, and it provided opportunities
for autonomous management. The
problem was that indigenous rights had
not been recognized or provided for in the
allocation of commercial fishing quota.
An interim settlement of Maorifisheries claims was negotiated in1989, and full and final settlement
signed and legislated for in 1992. The
principal effect of the settlement on the
customary fishing rights of Maori was to
split the commercial and non-commercial
components of those rights. This
distinction was necessary to
accommodate the settlement within the
broader fisheries management
framework, which was by then based on
the use of ITQ for commercial fisheries,
while non-commercial fishing continued
to be managed by regulation.
The commercial rights of Maori were
recognized through the provision of
assets comprising quota, shares and cash.
The 1989 interim settlement provided for
10 per cent of all existing ITQ to be bought
back from fishers and provided to Maori.
The 1992 Settlement centred on the
Crown’s provision to Maori of $150
million to purchase a half-share of Sealord
Products Ltd.  Sealords is the largest
commercial fishing company in New
Zealand, owning over 20 per cent of all
commercial fish quota. In addition, the
Crown has an ongoing obligation to
allocate 20 per cent of quota for fish
species newly introduced to the quota
management system to Maori. 
The Settlement legislation established the
Treaty of Waitangi Fisheries Commission,
previously the Maori Fisheries
Commission, to manage the commercial
settlement assets on behalf of Maori. The
quota held by the Commission is no
different from other ITQ generated under
the quota management system. The
Commission currently leases quota to
tribes on an annual basis. In time, the
quota will be allocated to the beneficiaries
of the settlement, giving them all the
benefits and obligations associated with
quota ownership.
The settlement is a world leader in terms
of resource transfer to indigenous people.
While other settlements have addressed
claims to individual fisheries, no other
country has transferred close to 30 per cent
of its total commercial fishing industry to
its indigenous people. Maori are the single
largest player in the rock lobster and paua
fishery, and one of the top two players in
the snapper fishery.  In conjunction with
managing these assets, the Commission
has become one of the best informed and
articulate participants in the New Zealand
fishing industry, providing valuable
advice both to government and to
industry bodies.
The Commission also invests in the future
of the Maori fishing industry, spending
around $1 million dollars annually on its
scholarship programme, training up to
300 young Maori a year. The programme
focuses on three areas: business
management, studies directly related to
fisheries, and a highly successful seafood
processing course. The Commission offers
up to nine $15,000 per year scholarships to
study at the Australian Maritime College
and the University of Tasmania.  
The non-commercial component of the
customary right was provided for through
regulations that devolve the management
of non-commercial customary fishing to
kaitiaki appointed by the tangata whenua.
The regulatory framework provides an
effective way of recognizing and
providing for the traditional fisheries
management practices of Maori. The
framework is highly flexible about the
way tangata whenua manage their fishing
activity, but prescriptive in terms of
mandate issues, recording of catch, and
accountability mechanisms.   
Mandated representatives
Tangata whenua must establish mandated
representatives for their area before they
can actively manage their
non-commercial fishing activity. The
regulations provide for tangata whenua to
appoint kaitiaki  who are responsible for
managing customary fishing in their area.
Disputes over who should be kaitiaki or
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over tribal boundaries must be resolved
by tangata whenua. 
Kaitiaki manage customary fishingthrough an authorization systemwhich requires them to specify the
exact nature of the fishing activity that is
being authorized, including species,
quantities, areas, size limits, methods,
purpose for which the fish will be used,
and instructions for the disposal of any
bycatch. Each of these factors is at the
discretion of the kaitiaki, who must act
within the bounds of sustainability and
with due regard for the environment.  
Regulations also provide for the
establishment of areas known as mataitai
reserves over traditional fishing grounds.
Mataitai reserves are a form of Territorial
Use Right. There is no commercial fishing
permitted within these reserves and all
non-commercial fishers, including
recreational fishers, must act in
accordance with bylaws made by the
kaitiaki when fishing within the reserve
area.
Fishers must report back their actual
catches to the kaitiaki, who record the
information for fisheries management
and compliance purposes. Kaitiaki must
report quarterly to the Ministry of
Fisheries on how many of each species
were taken out of each management area
within their traditional boundaries. The
information generated by the regulations
is then used to set sustainability measures,
and provides a powerful tool for tangata
whenua to participate in wider fisheries
management processes.  
After setting the Total Allowable Catch
(TAC) for a fishery, the Ministry of
Fisheries must share the TAC amongst the
three extractive fishing
sectors—customary non-commercial,
recreational and commercial. The
customary non-commercial needs of
Maori have a de facto priority in this
process—the needs of Maori are provided
for first, to the extent that they are not
commercial. In the small toheroa shellfish
fishery, this has resulted in the entire TAC
being set aside for customary
non-commercial needs.
Individual customary fishers are
accountable to the kaitiaki who authorizes
their activity.  Kaitiaki are primarily
accountable to the tangata whenua who
appoint them, and to the Ministry of
Fisheries, for the sustainable management
of fisheries and for the maintenance of
effective records for both management
and compliance purposes. The State is still
ultimately responsible for the overall
sustainability of fisheries and for the
provision of assistance to kaitiaki to enable
the effective operation of the customary
fishing regulations.
As a result of the 1992 Treaty settlement,
Maori now own around 40 per cent of
New Zealand’s commercial fish quota.
Taking joint ventures into account, Maori
have a controlling interest in more than 60
per cent of New Zealand’s commercial
fishing industry.  However, the
commercial assets of Maori continue to be
managed by the Treaty of Waitangi
Fisheries Commission on behalf of all
Maori, and have yet to be allocated to
tribes and/or any other beneficiaries
identified under the terms of the
settlement.
While many tribes are benefiting from the
annual leasing of quota by the
Commission at discounted rates, they will
not have autonomous control over the
management of their commercial fishing
activity until allocation has occurred. The
commercial interests and objectives of
Maori may differ from tribe to tribe. They
may also be different from the interests of
other commercial fishers in their area. ITQ
allocation will allow the different
priorities and interests of tribal groups to
be realized within the same framework,
while minimizing the opportunity or need
for the State to interfere with those
interests. 
Distribution inequities
Property rights instruments such as ITQ
are often given a number of negative
associations. These include the
privatization of what are seen to be
collective rights, inequities in the
distribution of rights, alienation of
traditional fishers from their livelihoods,
and even the demise of coastal
communities. However, as far as the
indigenous fishing rights in New Zealand
are concerned, all of these occurred to
some degree before the introduction of
ITQ.  Ironically, it has been the
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introduction of ITQ and other property
rights instruments that have provided a
means of addressing these issues. 
The introduction of the quotamanagement system meant thatthe Crown was able to buy back
rights from existing commercial fishers
and re-allocate them to Maori. This was
meant to compensate them for the
attenuation of their rights over the
previous 140 years (obviously, if the initial
allocation of ITQ had taken Maori rights
into account, no buy-back would have
been necessary). The Settlement
legislation ensures that the ITQ provided
to Maori remains under collective
ownership until such time as allocation
occurs.  
The Treaty of Waitangi Fisheries
Commission has been working on criteria
for tribes to be eligible to receive
settlement assets. One such criteria is that
tribal bodies must have constitutional
arrangements in place to ensure that the
collective commercial fishing rights of a
tribe, as represented by its share of quota
and cash, are not alienated from the tribe
without the necessary level of
accountability being present. Once
allocation has occurred, then the tribes can
manage their commercial fishing activity
the way that suits them, incorporating
whatever combination of economic and
social objectives they desire.
Tangata whenua are now regaining control
of their customary non-commercial
fishing activity. Customary fishing
regulations are now in place and are being
implemented by tribes and sub-tribes
around the country. The primary hurdle
facing tribes seeking to utilize the new
management framework is the
determination of mandate over areas, and
the resolution of disputes with
neighbouring groups over boundaries
and kaitiaki appointments.
Customary non-commercial fishing
rights, while not represented by ITQ, are
still considered property rights within
New Zealand’s fisheries management
framework. Fishers must fish within the
rules and limits specified by the kaitiaki for
the area, and must report back on what
they actually caught. The Ministry of
Fisheries must then make an allowance for
the extent of customary needs when
allocating the Total Allowable Catch (TAC)
for any fishery. The proportion of the TAC
set aside for customary non-commercial
take is effectively the property right
associated with customary
non-commercial fishing.
Management control
The aim of all tribal groups must be to
regain control over the management of all
their fishing activity, both commercial and
non-commercial. Once quota has been
allocated, and kaitiaki have been
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appointed, tangata whenua will be in a
position to manage their fisheries in a
more holistic manner. Importantly, the
well-defined rights of tangata whenua will
ensure that there is always fish available
for everything from commercial purposes
on marae  (meeting ground) to personal
consumption. 
The current direction of fisheriesmanagement in New Zealandforesees the devolution of
management responsibilities to
stakeholder groups, and stakeholder
participation in the development of
management plans for key fisheries
and/or areas. As a result of the indigenous
fisheries settlement, Maori are well placed
to take advantage of the opportunities
offered by such an environment. With
well-defined rights firmly secured, Maori
are destined to be at the centre of
co-operative management initiatives in
the future. 
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This article by Matthew Hooper
(Matthew.Hooper@fish.govt.nz), a
Senior Policy Analyst at the Ministry
of Fisheries in New Zealand, is
based on a paper co-authored
with Terry Lynch, presented at the
FishRights99 Conference in Perth,
Australia 
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Inshore fisheries
The Cedeira Charter
Inshore fishermen from the Cantabrican sea off 
Spain seek to unite under the banner of a new charter
The Spanish fishing sector, generallyportrayed as the ‘bad boy ofEurope’, wears another face.
Statistics show that one in four fishermen
in Europe are Spanish. There are some
71,000 registered fishermen in Spain, out
of a European total of 280,000. These
fishermen are said to be highly dependent
on fishing in other nation’s waters—be it
in other European countries’ waters or off
the coasts of Africa, Argentina, Chile, etc.
The Spanish fishing companies who
employ them also have a bad reputation
for disregarding regulations, such as
quota and size limits, and territorial
boundaries, and for ravaging
distant-water fishing grounds. Last but
not least, the Spanish are big consumers of
fish, with a high demand for small
(immature) fish for many traditional
dishes. Their market exerts strong
pressures on the fishing sector to both
overfish and target undersized fish.
However, looked at in another way, the
same statistics paint a rather different
picture of Spain. They also show that one
in six European fishermen are from the
Spanish small-scale inshore sector,
operating small craft and fishing within 12
miles of the Spanish coast. For these
fishermen and the communities where
they live, how to manage fishery resources
in a sustainable way has become a major
concern.
The area around the Bay of Biscay, one of
the most important fishing areas in
Europe, is the mainstay of the inshore
artisanal fisheries in both Spain and
France. However, overfishing caused by
overinvestment, surplus capacity and
environmentally destructive fishing
methods is affecting the prospects of
present and future coastal populations in
France and Spain. 
To discuss these issues, in March this year,
in the small Coruñan port of Cedeira,
representatives of some of the most
important cofradias (traditional
fishermen’s organizations) in Cantabrico
(Saint Jean de Luz, Hondarribia, Lastres,
Cedeira and Ares) met with
representatives from the local, national
and EU authorities, and with the
environmental organization, Greenpeace.
The ‘First Meeting of Inshore Fishermen
from the North-West Cantabrican Fishing
Grounds’ was, in many ways, a
watershed, and raised a number of highly
important issues. 
To begin with, it highlighted the fact that,
from all aspects, the situation on the
fishing grounds is extremely
serious—"the worst in its history"—and
that drastic measures must be taken to
guarantee resource recovery and to
establish sustainable levels of fishing.
In the second place, there is the no less
urgent task of defining, once and for all, a
fisheries policy with clear lines of
responsibility, which includes: 
• support directed to the artisanal
fishery—the most important
sector from a social and economic
perspective—using the Financial
Instrument for Fisheries Guidance
(FIFG—see Box 2), specifically
redirected for this purpose. (In the
past, only a relatively small part of
this was earmarked for inshore
artisanal fisheries); and 
• a debate on which fishing gear are
appropriate for the narrow shelf
area and multispecies fishery.
Doubts expressed
Antonio López Cribeiro, a biologist from
the Cedeira cofradia, wondered whether
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fisheries activities should be undertaken
by “a few large efficient units, or based on
a model of fishing which allows for the fair
distribution of resource wealth amongst
the coastal populations, and which is
environmentally sustainable.” Esteban
Olaizola, president of the Hondarribia
cofradia, put it more graphically: “There
are no clear policies, we are like sailing
boats having to take whatever wind blows
our way”.
The Cedeira Charter, adopted andsigned by all those present at themeeting, has subsequently
received the backing of 50 cofradias and the
Galician Environmental Federation. The
document (summarized in Box 3) brings
together a number of key issues.
First and foremost, it has brought together
a large number and wide variety of
geographically dispersed cofradias, who
recognize that they share a common
problem caused by excessive fishing
effort, increasing efficiency in fishing gear
and vessel technology, poor gear
selectivity, and the environmental impact
caused by their activities. Historically, one
of the greatest problems that has afflicted
the sector has been the lack of unity and
organization. This meeting was thus seen
as an important first step in addressing
this issue.
From this perspective, the proposal made
by Robert Alvarez from the Basque NGO,
Itsas Geroa (‘The Future of the Sea’), to
establish a permanent Cedeira Charter
Round Table, is highly important. Such a
Round Table should be capable of taking
forward the negotiation and
implementation of the issues raised by the
Charter. It should also represent the group
of cofradias with the administration and
with regard to the international
dimensions that must be taken into
account when dealing with these issues.
Secondly, the fishermen themselves
proposed, and agreed on, measures to
restrict their own activities, including a
revision of mesh size and minimal landing
sizes according to biological criteria, the
establishment of seasonally closed areas,
and the need for strict vigilance and
control on the landings of all of the fleets.
“The philosophy of the current document
is based exclusively on the urgent need to
adopt appropriate measures to allow the
sea to recover, for all of us in the different
sectors and in the fisheries administration
to assume our share of the blame, and to
be ready to work together in this new
millennium to transform our predatory
approach into a more responsible attitude
towards the sea, with its resource wealth,
and the marine ecosystem with its rich
biodiversity,” states a letter to the Ministry
of Agriculture, Livestock and  Fisheries.
Ecological lesson
In this regard, a lesson in ecological
economics was given to the whole
meeting during the intervention made by
Esteban Olaizola: “We do not believe that
Sp
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 Small-scale fisheries in Galicia
In Galicia the fishers of the Xunta (autonomous
government of Galicia) are classified into three
main groups:
•  bivalve shellfishers (marisqueos),
gathering in the inter-tidal zone or by
boat;
•  inshore fishers (pesca de bajura); and
•  offshore fishers (in EEZ and distant
waters).
According to the 1994 census, there are 8,811
legally registered vessels and 28,014 fishers in
Galicia. In practice, there are many engaged in
fishing on a part-time basis. For example, there
are over 8,000 women shellfish gatherers
(mariscadoras), and many (unregistered)
people who supplement their incomes
seasonally (retired persons, taxi drivers,
shopkeepers, unemployed persons, etc.).
There are also many people who fish illegally.
In Galicia, the inshore sector employs about 70
per cent of the full-time fishers (i.e. some 5,600
people), operating around 4,300 vessels less
than 9 metres in length. The inshore sector
comprises a fleet that fishes on the continental
shelf (demersal and pelagic fisheries), and a
fleet that operates in the coastal embayments
(rías), shallow oceanic areas.
—by Juan Friere and Antonio Garcia-Allut 2000 
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it is the fishermen who are the producers,
it is not like that at all... it is the fishes
themselves. We may or may not have a
future, depending on how we harvest this
production”. 
In this, as in so many other areas,conventional economics, let alonefisheries economics, has not been able
to address this relationship between
production and the ecosystem. It is on this
vision that the artisanal fishery must build
its credibility, “although, in all
probability, our grandfathers did not
know about ecology... they were as much
fishermen as us,” Esteban added.
The interventions received the agreement
of all those present. Fernando Braña,
representing the cofradia of Lastres
(Asturias), called attention to the need to
phase out destructive gear like bobbin
(rock-hopper) trawls, and the issue of
modernization of other gear. Citing the
case of the increasing size of trawl doors,
he observed that “with such high vertical
openings, these gear could almost be
considered as pelagic”. He further stated
that “we are not against modernization in
areas such as safety, but very much
against such innovations in gear design,”
adding that “before, we used to live with
traditional trawls”. 
On the subject of bobbin trawls, which
allow trawlers to work in rocky areas,
Braña showed his anger: “We no longer
haul up live coral as before, we only haul
it up dead. How is dead ground supposed
to produce?”
Fleet modernization
Félix Cudillero, representing the cofradia
of Ares, another small Coruñan town,
highlighted fleet modernization as a key
issue: “We can’t think why FIFG monies
have been used to renew the trawler fleet
in such a fundamental way, when they
were created for entirely different
purposes.” He went on to add that
“although the number of trawlers has
decreased, the catching capacity of the
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Financial instrument for fisheries guidance
Many aspects of the European Common
Fisheries Policy, which provides the framework
for all aspects of European fisheries both within
and outside European waters, are currently
under review. Two aspects are particularly
important for the European inshore fisheries: 
• the decision on how fisheries will be
managed and regulated in the 6-12
mile zone after 2002, and 
• the decision on how European struc-
tural funds (through the Financial Instru-
ment for Fisheries Guidance—FIFG) will
be used to restructure the European
fishing sector. 
Since the early 1980s, a series of Multi-Annual
Guidance Programmes (MAGPs) have been the
main tools used for managing the structural
aspects of the European fishing fleet. In
essence, the main, but rather conflicting,
objectives of these MAGPs are to maintain a
modern, efficient fishing fleet, while keeping the
fleet capacity in line with the stocks available. 
The FIFG is derived from the European
Structural Funds, which were originally
intended for supporting economic development
in Europe’s remote, less well-developed
regions.
Over the last two decades, the lion’s share of
FIFG has been allocated mainly to a fleet
modernization programme based on a ‘scrap
and build’ policy, which has represented more
than half the budget of the Common Fisheries
Policy. The misuse of these FIFG subsidies has
been one of the main factors contributing to the
alarming situation today, where the European
fishing fleet shows at least 40 per cent
overcapacity for the stocks available. It has
also led a situation of smaller-sized fleets and
lower employment, but a greater catching
capacity and a greater concentration of wealth
in the sector. 
Only a very small proportion has been
allocated to the small-scale sector (about 10
per cent), mainly through the PESCA initiative
(which has now ended). PESCA was adopted in
1994 to solve the socio-economic problems of
restructuring. Monies were made available for
such measures as improving the professional
qualifications of fishermen, diversification of
activities in coastal areas (tourism, aquaculture,
etc.), providing medical assistance vessels for
the deep-sea fleet, etc. 
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fleet is much greater. But we must all take
our share of the blame and be ready to
work to change things.”
The charter also emphasizes theneed to develop sustainablefisheries through systems of
management that are not based only on
the quantitative aspects of the resource.
As a basic prerequisite for restoring
stocks, there is also a need to conserve a
healthy ecosystem. 
From this arises the need for a clearly
defined fisheries policy, which deals with
the artisanal sector from the perspective of
its structural characteristics: “The
proposals have been formulated by the
inshore fishery which, from a social and
economic perspective, represents no less
than the most important sector of the
national fleet, comprising an activity
essential to the economy of all small
fishing ports. Consisting of fisheries
limited in size by our narrow continental
shelf, it is the very antithesis of industrial
fishing, and is organized through a
structure of family businesses, which is
the reason why we are motivated to
involve ourselves in the prosecution of a
sustainable model of fishing for the sake
of both the fishermen of today and for
generations to come.”
It is important to place the Cedeira Charter
in context. Last summer, the specialized
press reported the Fisheries Minister’s
intention, for the coming season, to
modify the areas seasonally closed to
trawling “as a measure aimed at
improving the protection of juvenile hake,
given the highly precarious state of stocks,
and the dangers of fishery collapse.” 
Seasonal closure
The measures, which entered into force on
1 January 2000, were supposed to widen
the seasonally closed fishing area around
La Coruña—the main recruitment
area—and to create a new area around
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 The Cedeira Charter in brief
1. Proposals for demersal fishing:
Three main issues were highlighted:
• the need for an immediate halt on the
capture of juveniles;
• the need to regulate the capture of
adults; and
• the need to conserve the ecosystem.
To address these issues, we demand:
1.1. An immediate halt to the use of
‘rock-hopper bobbin trawls’ and semi-pelagic
pair trawling. The inshore fishery has no
problems with the use of traditional trawling
methods, such as those which have been used
for over three centuries, and which have
always shared in the fishery and complied with
the rules.
1.2. The immediate implementation of the
regulation which alters the closed season for
bottom-trawling on the northwest Cantabrican
fishing grounds.
1.3. Review of the minimum size restrictions for
target species. It defies logic for species such
as hake to have the minimum size restrictions
set below the size at maturity. We demand that
biological criteria be applied when setting these
limits.
1.4. Review of mesh size regulations. We
demand that mesh sizes below 70 mm be
banned in bottom trawls fishing in waters less
than 200 metres deep, and are permanently
banned from use in the 12-mile zone (territorial
sea).
1.5. Standardization of weekly rest periods. A
rest period of 48-hour duration should be
applied which, as a general rule, corresponds
to the weekend. This will promote better
fisheries management and the well-being of the
fishing families. Under special conditions,
fishery plans which fulfil the required proportion
of two days rest for every seven may be
considered. 
1.6. Monitoring and control of all the fleets. We
demand a permanent increase in the
monitoring and control of fish landings, and at
all stages in the marketing chain. 
2. Proposals for pelagic fishing: 
Although there is an alarming reduction in
profitability in the fisheries of the Bay of Biscay,
Cantibrica and Galicia, the use of pelagic trawls
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Cedeira, along with the removal of the
closed area around Muros, where the
concentration of juveniles is not so high
and where the closure has not been very
effective. The seasonal closure of this area
was to be extended from three to six
months, from 1 September to 31 March.
The response of the trawler sectorwas twofold: (a) a basic call for anyclosure to be applied equally to
everyone. “The impact of this fishery
regulation could be classified as
persecution against this fishing method
(trawling) which, it seems, is being made
a scapegoat for all that is wrong,” was a
typical repsonse; and (b) a call for more
scientific research.
As regards the latter demand, scientific
opinion is unanimous. The same
recommendations have been made for
over 20 years. Given that recruitment is
relatively independent of the size of the
breeding stock and given the habits of
juvenile hake to accumulate in groups in
muddy, trawlable areas, “this situation
can only be improved through reductions
in fishing effort and through technical
conservation measures, like the increase
in mesh size, and the establishment of
closures in those areas and seasons where
there are the greatest concentrations of
juveniles.”
The trawl is the main gear catching
juvenile hake and, if any fishery closures
are made to protect the breeding stock that
will affect all the other gear, it seems that
this would have to involve defining
distinct zones during distinct periods.
There are other measures, such as
increasing mesh size (one of the points
raised in the Cedeira Charter), which
could also be used for this goal. 
Multi-species catch
In the case of trawling, increases in mesh
size would not take into account the
multi-species nature of the catch and the
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and Naveran (high vertical opening) trawls
continues to destroy such important species as
anchovy, sardine and Northern bonito.
We, therefore, demand:
• the total ban on drift nets in EU waters;
• the adoption of a moratorium on the
use of pelagic and high vertical opening
(Naveran) trawls in the community
waters of the Bay of Biscay and South
of the 46th parallel;
• the control of discards made in these
zones by independent observers; and
• the adoption of measures which specifi-
cally avoid the capture of immature fish.
3. Other proposals:
3.1. Closed seasons (biological rest periods)
subsidized by the authorities. No  component of
the fisheries sector should have to bear the
costs created by decades of acquiescence and
inertia, and vessels affected by protection
measures such as biological and seasonal
closures should be able to access
compensation from public funds. 
3.2. The new FIFG 2000-2006 should be used
to strengthen the inshore fishery. Although
thousands of millions of pesetas (hundreds of
millions of dollars)  have been spent, the crisis
has worsened and the Spanish Atlantic fishery
is now in the most critical phase in its history. 
We, therefore, demand that the new FIFG be
used to rehabilitate the sea, and be directed
towards specific objectives: 
• halt overexploitation of fishery popula-
tions by subsidizing fishery closures
(biological rests and other closures)
that the scientists consider necessary;
• bring the capacity of the fleet into line
with the resources available, with the
priority of removing permanently those
vessels which are most destructive;
• renew and strengthen the fleet practis-
ing selective fishing, which is environ-
mentally sensitive and avoids catching
immature fish; and
• elaborate the measures and services
necessary to guarantee the strict com-
pliance with the protection measures
adopted.
Agreed in the port of Cedeira, La Coruña,
March 4th 2000. 
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fact that hake is not the main species
caught. (Mackerel, scad, blue whiting,
monkfish and ray are also caught.) Above
all, we are faced with the need to define,
once and for all, the kinds of fishing gear
that are compatible with our fishing
opportunities, under what conditions and
under what levels of fishing. 
Once this is decided—and we aretalking about a political decisionof some magnitude, where it will
be difficult to reach an agreement that will
keep both sides happy—it will be
necessary to find ways of achieving the
objectives of sustainability proposed. The
new FIFG 2000-2006 should play a major
role in solving these problems, created by
so many years of irresponsible fisheries
policies. 
The Greenpeace representative, Arnau
Mateu, proposed several criteria that
could be used to guide the process of
eliminating the excess capacity (fishing
effort) and that would help to transform
the use of fishing gear towards achieving
sustainable fishing that respects the
ecosystem. More important than the need
to reduce global fishing effort, the priority
of the hour must be to eliminate those
fishing gear which cause the greatest
damage to the marine environment as
well as those which cause the greatest
social impact. This would involve
applying criteria such as:
• the levels of bycatch and discards
of non-commercial species. (The
Spanish Oceanographic Institute
warns in their report that discards
of hake in the size range 8-25 cm
could be more than 30 million
individuals per trawl.)
• the damage caused to the marine
ecosystem—for example,
alterations produced in the
benthos (which has reached
extreme levels with the
introduction of new fishing gear
like the bobbin trawl).
• the impact on key species in the
food chain (an aspect which has
hardly been studied).
• the quality of the product which
arrives on the market (Fernando
Gonzalez Laxe, president of the
Fisheries Committee of the EU,
placed particular emphasis on this
aspect. As well as mentioning the
need to establish protected areas
from fishing activities, he
highlighted the possibilities for
ecolabelling and the need to
influence outlets not to sell
immature fish).
• employment generated (one of the
characteristics of the artisanal
sector, which, in Galicia, has more
than 8,000).
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Despite continued calls from theinshore sector, the fisheriesclosure proposed by the Ministry
of Fisheries has never been implemented.
It remains to be seen whether it will be
implemented in September. The
organizations party to the Cedeira Charter
are particularly concerned that the lack of
political will to deal with this chronic
fisheries problem will mean the continued
demise of the fishery.
The Ministry of Fisheries, for its part, has
continued to promise that it would apply
the restrictive regulations needed to
ensure the recovery of stocks in the
Cantabrican Sea. It has also been trying to
get the trawler and artisanal fleets to agree
on the new measures to be adopted.
According to the ministry, they should
submit their own proposals once its
scientific report has been made available.
But what about the precautionary
principle, which places burden of proof on
the authorities and the fishing industry to
show that fishing activities are not
damaging the resource? And why must
we wait for new reports before acting,
when, for so many years, all the reports
have been saying exactly the same things?
These issues were discussed at a meeting
organized by the Ministry of Fisheries
with representatives of the inshore and
trawling sectors. In a subsequent
statement, Samuel Juarez, General
Secretary of Fisheries, announced: “There
is general agreement that measures must
be taken to allow the fishery to recover.
But not that some areas should be
reserved only for certain fleets or that
some gear should be banned from the
fishing grounds, because the fishing
grounds are unique and belong to
everybody.” 
This outcome was not unexpected, and
was the main reason why the cofradia of
Cedeira, which called for the Charter,
boycotted the meeting. The closing
remarks of the Fisheries Chancellor of the
Galician Xunta certainly came as no
surprise, when he announced that “there
are neither good nor bad fishing gear; it
depends on how they are used” and that
“we must be prepared to tighten our
belts.”
Finally, at least we have the opportunity
to continue working on the Charter which
provides an opportunity for the artisanal
sector to push their demands forward on
a joint platform. We are waiting
expectantly to see how this conflict
evolves. 
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This article, by Sebastian Losada
(r007527901@abonados.cplus.es) of
La Coruña, Galicia, has been
translated by Brian O’Riordan
(icsfbrussels@yucom.be)
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Fisheries agreements
Socializing costs, privatizing benefits
As more and more supertrawlers are being built, 
it is time to critically review the EU’s fisheries policy
On his first official visit to Franceafter winning the elections inMarch, president-elect
Abdoulaye Wade called on French
entrepreneurs and vessel owners to
consider investing in the Senegalese
fishery. According to the CFFA (Coalition
for Fair Fisheries Arrangements)
Newsletter No. 9, August 2000, he
promised such investors “a highly liberal
legal and fiscal framework” to facilitate
their ventures.
Increasingly, European fishing companies
are seeking ‘private’ deals to secure access
to distant-water fishing grounds. This
alarming trend was commented on four
years ago, in an article written for
SAMUDRA Report (“On to the next
generation”, 15 July 1996) by Helene
Bours. “The trend is clearly towards
privatization of the agreements and
liberalization of trade...,” which,
“...appears to depart from ’classical’
bilateral fisheries agreements, which have
their faults, but which at least have been
subject to some—although very
limited—form of democratic control.”
The conclusion of such deals is
increasingly the norm for European
fishing companies seeking alternative
access rights to secure fish supplies in a
context of dwindling local resources,
increasingly strong (and unsatisfied)
market demand, and decreasing access
opportunities within European waters. A
recent article in the French paper Le Marin
highlighted the dependence of the
Brittany fishing port of Lorient on poisson
avion (fish by air) coming from Guinea,
thanks to fishing activities secured
through private French deals.
The article also said that such deals are, in
fact, far from ‘private’. Considerable
amounts of European taxpayers’ monies
are being used to subsidize them. In the
case of Guinea, French trawlers have been
transferred, thanks to subsidies from the
’structural funds’—the Fisheries
Instrument for Fisheries Guidance
(FIFG)—of the Common Fisheries Policy
(CFP). In the words of one operator, “To get
grants for building new trawlers,
fishermen must sell their old boats outside
Europe. Why shouldn’t they go to fish in
Guinea?” 
Thanks to FIFG support, fishermen can
now transfer their vessels to third
countries rather than scrapping them.
Such transfers may be temporary (joint
ventures) or permanent (joint
enterprises). In the latter case, they must
be re-flagged. These subsidies provide the
mechanism through which Europe is
increasingly able to achieve two urgent
objectives: reduce surplus domestic
fishing capacity, and meet the supply
needs of its market. 
However, and as noted by Bours, at least
in the ’classical’ agreements, there is some
form of democratic control. Such
possibilities do not exist in the use of other
financial instruments to subsidize ‘private
access agreements’.  This lack of
transparency came in for particular
criticism in a 1998 European Court of
Auditors report (No 18/98) on subsidized
joint ventures which noted that, once
funding had been transferred to the
applicant country, it was extremely hard
to trace how the monies were used.
Changing relations
In November 1999, CFFA documented the
changing nature of European fishing
relations with countries in the South in a
brochure titled A Fishy Business: ACP-EU
Fisheries Relations: Who Benefits at What
Cost?. Based on six case studies from
Mauritania, Senegal, Kenya, South Africa,
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Argentina, Madagascar, and an analysis
of European Union policies and
instruments, it clearly shows that the
trend is from ‘fisheries agreements’
(formal framework agreements) to
‘fisheries arrangements’ (less structured
arrangements, which combine several
policy and financial instruments). 
In its introduction, A Fishy Businesscomments: “ACP fisheries are beingintegrated into the world economy
through a wide variety of often
overlapping ways. While trade relations
are mainly responsible for this integration,
various other mechanisms are also at play.
These include: fisheries access
agreements; private access agreements;
various schemes for the promotion of joint
enterprises and joint ventures; direct
investment and, in some cases, outright
illegal fishing.”
The EU policies which directly affect the
integration of ACP fisheries into the world
economy include: EU Development
Co-operation; the Lome Convention (a
new agreement was recently concluded in
Cotonou, Benin); Trade Policy; and the
international and structural policies of the
Common Fisheries Policy. 
It was for this reason that that CFFA
decided to change its name from the
Coalition for Fair Fisheries Agreements to
the Coalition for Fair Fisheries
Arrangements.
With the signing of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS) in 1982, and its ratification in
1994, the unilateral declaration of national
200-mile Exclusive Fishing Zones
received the full support of international
law.
The UNCLOS process exerted considerable
influence on the EU (the then European
Economic Community) decision that all
member States should extend their
national fishing limits to 200 miles in
January 1977, and that competency for all
jurisdictional and policy matters should
be ceded to the European Commission.
This included providing the Commission
with the authority to negotiate “with
certain third countries with a view to
concluding ’framework agreements’ on
fishing access.” The first such ‘framework
agreement’ to be signed with a developing
country was with Senegal in 1979. 
‘Framework agreements’ were based on
the issue of the ‘surplus stocks’ not caught
by the local sector (UNCLOS Article 62.2),
and the other UNCLOS provisions (for
example, those listed in Articles 61 and 62)
relating to the conservation and
management of living marine resources. 
First-generation agreements
These so-called ‘first-generation
agreements’ came to be the norm for all
subsequent fisheries access agreements
negotiated between Europe and
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developing countries. They are, in the
words of Bours, “pay, fish and scoot”
agreements. Initially, they were seen as
providing a kind of ‘manna from heaven’
to the revenue of developing country
governments, in the form of ‘no-strings
attached’ funding for depleted State
coffers. 
In this regard, they became powerfultools for subverting the spirit of theUNCLOS provisions. Instead of
providing a transitory bridge to enable
coastal States in the South to develop their
fisheries, they used fisheries resources as
a bargaining chip, to be negotiated against
other interests (political, foreign
exchange, commercial, etc.). In effect, the
first generation of fisheries agreements
have created a State dependency on
foreign access to provide necessary
foreign exchange and other patronage,
and reduced  development concerns to
the market value of fisheries resources to
the fleets of the North. 
The signing of the Maastricht treaty in
1995 (The Treaty of the EU) with its
‘coherence clause’ (see box), provided
citizens’ groups with important
opportunities to influence EU policies, and
led them to campaign for coherence in
fisheries agreements (see CFFA Report
Squaring the Circle, 1995). This campaign
sought to find ways to ensure coherence
between fisheries agreements practice
(under the provisions of the Common
Fisheries Policy), on the one hand, and, on
the other, the policy objectives for
development co-operation. 
Consequently, the importance of
achieving coherence was addressed by a
Council of Development Ministers
Regulation on Fishery and Development
in June 1997. This “stressed the need for an
integrated policy approach to sustainable
fishing in third countries, which takes into
account, besides the interests of the EC, the
interests of the local fishery sector, as well
as the principle of sustainability of the
resources.”
The importance “of achieving coherence
between these agreements and European
development policy” has also been
acknowledged by the EU Council of
Fisheries Ministers (CFFA Newsletter No.
6, 1998). They also proposed that the
Commission carry out a full cost-benefit
analysis of fisheries agreements, urging
that this exercise take into account
“non-quantifiable  elements such as the
Union’s political relations, the strategic
importance of the Community’s fleet
presence in the waters of the third
country...” 
Simplistic conclusion
However, disappointingly, the
consultants chosen to carry out this
work—the prestigious French
Government Marine Research Institute,
IFREMER—have hardly addressed the
‘non-quantifiable aspects’. Rather, they
draw the simplistic conclusion that
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 The coherence commitment
Under Article 130v of the Treaty of the
European Union, the EU has a legal obligation
to take into account the objectives of its
development co-operation policy “in the policies
that it implements which are likely to affect
developing countries.”
These objectives are set out in Article 130V of
the Treaty of European Union  and commits the
EU to: 
• the sustainable economic and social
development of developing countries,
particularly the most disadvantaged;
• the campaign against poverty;
• the smooth and gradual integration of
developing countries into the world
economy;
• respect for human rights, fundamental
freedoms and the rule of law;
• the promotion and consolidation of
democracy.
This means, in effect, that all EU policies which
effect fisheries sectors in ACP countries should
contribute to sustainable economic and social
development to the benefit of the most
disadvantaged.
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fisheries agreements provide two million
tonnes of fish annually, with most of the
value being added in Europe. Also, in
their estimation, fisheries agreements
provide the EU fishing industry some 2000
million euros annually. Fisheries
agreements are, therefore, ‘a good thing’
for the EU! 
Such positive conclusions are insharp contrast to the conclusions ofa report by the same institution
commissioned by the Development
Committee of the European Parliament.
This study on co-operation in the fisheries
sector between the EU and ACP States by
IFREMER and Cofrepeche concludes that
such value-added processing should be
carried out in the ACP States themselves.
However, the debate on coherence could
become a dead-end if the existing trends
towards privatizing agreements continue,
and research is not objective and
independent. There is a need to ensure
that agreements are transparent and
parties to them are held accountable, and
that research is in the public domain. Also
that, as CFFA has emphasized in the
introduction to A Fishy Business,  “policies
need to be set in place to ensure that the
poor, resource-dependent and vulnerable
communities increasingly benefit from
the exploitation of fisheries resources and
the integration of the country fisheries
sectors into the world economy.”
While they still remain the norm for
EU-ACP fisheries agreements, it is clear that
the days of the first generation of fisheries
agreements are over. In 1996, Emma
Bonino, the then Commissioner for
Fisheries was quoted as saying: “New
agreements will replace an unfair
system... where we arrive, fish, pay almost
nothing and leave—with zero control. I
share the opinion of those who say that the
first-generation accords simply wiped out
the fish, as has happened in Senegal and
Guinea, because, generally, there is no
control. We must set out from the basis
that such (developing) nations, both those
interested in developing their fishing
capacity, and the ones that have other
priorities, sell their resources, and thus
hold bilateral accords. But I think that the
old and unfair accords are gone forever.” 
As noted above, there are worrying signs
that new arrangements are already in
place, having slipped in through the back
door. The writing is no longer on the wall.
New arrangements are a fact of life, and
NGOs, fishworker organizations and other
promoters of socially and
environmentally responsible and
sustainable fisheries need to move with
the times or get left behind. 
New-generation agreement
The first and only ‘new generation’ of
agreements was signed between the EU
and Argentina in 1993. The
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environmental, political and social
impacts of this agreement have been
far-reaching. As noted in the CFFA Fishy
Business case study on Argentina,
“Overall, the agreement has resulted in:
the severe depletion of the hake resource,
the emergence of a substantial
overcapacity in the Argentine fishing
fleet, the emergence of stock depletion in
the inshore fishery, and a socioeconomic
crisis in the local fisheries sector.”
Argentinean hake stocks werealready a cause for concern at thetime of the signing of the
agreement in 1993. For this reason, strict
ceilings were applied to the numbers of
hake licences and quotas, with the
agreement making a clear demarcation
over access rights between hake
(non-surplus) and non-hake (surplus)
species. 
CeDePesca, a local citizens’ group based
in Mar del Plata, noted in several reports
that EU fishing companies were
systematically abusing the provisions of
the agreement. And, according to an
official Argentinean government report,
“each incoming vessel licensed to catch
surplus (hake) species has tried, with or
without success, to diversify into catching
non-surplus species or species not
included in the original licence.” 
The EU vessels were able to abuse the
provisions of the agreement mainly
thanks to the lack of proper monitoring,
control and surveillance (MCS), but also
because the Fisheries Sub-Secretary was
himself the Director of the Gallician
trawler owners’ society—the biggest
interest group in Argentinean fisheries. 
When the authorities tried to take
corrective measures, they were
challenged in the courts by the Gallician
shipowners of “applying discriminatory
measures” against them. This led to
prolonged legal battles, while the pillage
of the hake and other Argentine fish stocks
continued with impunity. The cost to the
Argentinean marine environment and the
resource-dependent fishing communities
has been high. It will take time and further
costs to rectify the structural, political,
socioeconomic and environmental
damage caused by this EU agreement.
There are, however, signs of hope. Twelve
months after the EU-Argentine fisheries
agreement ended, Argentina’s new
President promised to ban hake fishing by
foreign-owned vessels. This essentially
refers to the Spanish-owned vessels
transferred to the Argentine register
through the 1992 EU-Argentine fisheries
agreement.
Socioeconomic objectives
It is clear that if the fisheries of developing
countries are to continue to contribute to
social and economic objectives, then the
environmental and social costs of fisheries
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arrangements with distant-water nations
must be fully taken into consideration. 
In the context of Europe, CFFA arecalling for full environmental andsocial impact analyses to be carried
out prior to any new fisheries initiative
being approved. Fisheries access
arrangements should also conform to a set
of independently agreed criteria, or a
Code of Conduct for Responsible
Fisheries Arrangements. CFFA propose
that such a code should be based on the
FAO Code of Conduct, including five basic
principles from the FAO Code:
• the principle of protecting the
livelihood rights of coastal
communities;
• the principle of ensuring the use of
selective and non-destructive
fishing gear and practices;
• the principle of ensuring effective
monitoring and control;
• the principle of transparency and
stakeholder participation;
• the principle of guaranteeing safe
and adequate working conditions
aboard distant-water fishing
vessels.
Also, and particularly in the case of shared
stocks, a regional approach should be
adopted. This issue was the subject of a
recent meeting in Guinea Conakry, jointly
organised by CFFA and the local NGO
ADEPEG (see CFFA Newsletter No. 9,
September 2000). Involving organizations
from Mauritania, Senegal, France, Benin
and Guinea, the meeting highlighted the
need for a full involvement of the artisanal
fisheries sector in the decision-making
processes. One of the invited guests was a
representative of the Sub-regional
Committee on Fisheries, an organization
represented by the Fisheries Ministers of
six West African States (Mauritania, Cape
Verde, Guinea Conakry, Guinea Bissau,
Senegal, and Gambia). A shared stock of
particular concern is the sardinelle, which
migrates between Morocco, Mauritania
and Senegal. 
Recent catches of this species in West
African waters have risen from 300,000
tonnes to 500,000 tonnes. Of this, some
300,000 tonnes is the estimated catch of the
artisanal fishing fleet of Senegal and
Mauritania, employing around 100,000
fishermen. For them, sardinelle is the
‘staple of the poor’. A further 150,000
tonnes is the estimated catch of five Dutch
supertrawlers. 
In the light of the recent new building in
Europe of more pelagic supertrawlers (the
largest and most powerful fishing vessels
in the world), and the activities of
European companies to secure subsidized
access through a number of ‘backdoor’
arrangements, the question arises as to
whether the activities of such large and
powerful vessels should be made illegal. 
The EU is currently reviewing several
aspects of its CFP. Of particular interest are
two aspects:
• the conclusions and
recommendations that will be
applied as a result of the
‘cost-benefit analysis of fisheries
agreements’;
• the framework through which EU
subsidies will be applied to the
restructuring of Europe’s
overcapacity in fishing fleet;
The common thread running through
these review processes is how European
taxpayers’ monies will be used to arrange
European fisheries sector access to
resources, in domestic, third-country and
international waters. 
Since June, European development and
environmental NGOs have been
participating in the European
Commission’s Advisory Committee on
Fisheries and Aquaculture (ACFA). Thanks
to a large extent to the efforts of the
previous Fisheries Commissioner, Emma
Bonino, this mainly industry-interest
group has recently been opened up to
other interests (including NGOs, consumer
groups, trade unions, etc). 
NGO collaboration
The common platform of the NGOs is
sustainable development, where
environmental and social aspects are seen
as two sides of the same coin. Their
collaboration is trying to address the
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question of whom and what ‘sustainable
fisheries development’ is for. Both groups
recognize the central role of coastal
communities and artisanal fisheries in
achieving sustainable development. For
this reason, the seat allocated to
development NGOs has been taken up by
Daniele le Sauce, President of the French
Branch of the World Forum of Fish
Harvesters and Fish Workers, and the
wife of a French fisherman who takes an
active role in the promoting role of women
in fisheries. 
In the next few months, theCommission will publish a ‘greenpaper’ which will set the scene for the
CFP review. Delegates of development and
environment NGOs in ACFA are being
asked to participate in the production and
formal approval processes of this
document. On the development aspects,
their inputs include the CFFA proposals for
fisheries arrangements outlined above
(Code of Conduct and Environmental and
Social Impact Assessments). 
It is too early to assess whether the
involvement of NGOs in the formal
Commission processes will lead to
improvements in fisheries policies and
access arrangements. But it could be a step
in the right direction, particularly with
regard to getting access to information. To
a certain extent, information is power, and
being forewarned is being forearmed.
Watch this space!
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Women in fisheries
Invisibly yours
The useful work and energy that women expend in fisheries remain 
invisible and undervalued, as participants at a workhop in Brazil reported
A six-day workshop on Gender andCoastal Fishing Communities inLatin America was organized
recently, in June 2000, in the coastal
fishing village of Prainha do Canto Verde,
in the State of Ceara, Brazil, as part of
ICSF’s Women in Fisheries (WIF)
programme.
The workshop had the following
objectives:
• to develop an understanding of
trends in fisheries development
and their implications for coastal
fishing communities in the Latin
American context;
• to make visible women’s roles in
fisheries and in fishing
communities in Latin America,
and to reflect on strategies to
strengthen their meaningful
participation; and
• to facilitate greater networking
among organizations
representing, and working with,
artisanal fishworkers in the Latin
American context.
A total of 36 persons participated in the
workshop, including representatives
from five countries in the Latin American
region, i.e. Chile, Peru, Brazil, Ecuador
and Mexico, and representatives of ICSF
from India, Belgium and Brazil. The group
that came together was diverse and rich in
experience. It included representatives
from the Confederacion Nacional de
Pescadores Artesanales de Chile
(CONAPACH), Federacion de Integracion Y
Unificacion de Pescadores (FIUPAP),
Movimento Nacional dos Pescadores
(MONAPE) and Federación Nacional de
Cooperativas Pesqueras del Ecuador
(FENACOPEC), the national fishworker
organizations from Chile, Peru, Brazil and
Ecuador respectively. It also included
representatives from NGOs, research
institutes and organizations supporting
fishworkers from Brazil, Chile, Peru and
Mexico. 
Participants included both men and
women. This was a conscious decision,
since gender was seen as an issue which
both men and women of fishworker
organizations, NGOs, etc. need to engage
with. Equally significant, all the country
delegations felt similarly, and both the
male and female leadership of the
organizations invited participated in the
workshop. 
As part of the pre-workshop preparations,
five background papers on gender and
fisheries were prepared from four
countries in the Latin American region:
one each from Chile, Peru and Mexico and
two from Brazil. These papers were useful
in highlighting important issues vis-à-vis
gender and fisheries in several countries
of the region, and they provided the
backdrop for discussions during the
workshop.
The main sessions included presentations
and discussions on the following: 
• a global overview of trends in
fisheries development, with
special reference to the Latin
American context;
• background papers on gender and
fisheries in countries of the Latin
American region;
• World Forum of Fish Harvesters
and Fish Workers (WFF);
• the development debate and a
framework for social analysis as a
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possible tool to analyze social
reality and the reality of fishing
communities;
• globalization and social
movements in Latin America; and
• fishworker organizations in the
Latin American region.
During the workshop, it becameclear that in all the countriesrepresented, i.e. Chile, Peru,
Brazil, Ecuador and Mexico, the pressure
on coastal fishing communities and on
their livelihoods is increasing. This is also
a consequence of globalization and the
neoliberal policies being adopted by
States in the region. 
The picture that emerged about the work
of women within the fisheries and within
fishing communities was revealing. It was
clear, of course, that this differs by culture
and region and between rural and urban
areas, and that, it is not possible to
generalize. The common factor, however,
is that the work of women is rarely seen as
‘productive’. It has low social value and is
normally seen as an extension of the
‘domestic’ space. Little value is attached to
the domestic and community tasks
performed by women.
This is despite the enormous diversity of
tasks performed by women. Within the
fisheries, women may work in marketing,
preparing bait, making and repairing nets,
collecting crabs and shellfish, gathering
and cultivating seaweed and algae,
smoking, salting and drying fish, and, in
rare cases, fishing itself. 
Women also take on work on behalf of
their fishermen husbands, such as dealing
with financial institutions for credit for
fisheries operations and for repayment,
dealing with the governmental fisheries
agencies, and so on. 
They are very active in the processing
sector, as either part-time or full-time
workers in processing plants. The nature
of the work they do is typically repetitive
and low-paid. The conditions of work and
social security leave much to be desired. 
Often, women of coastal fishing
communities take on activities outside the
fishery, that give them some form of stable
monetary income, since the income from
the fishery is inherently unstable and
unpredictable. Also, given the nature of
work of the fishermen and their frequent
absences, women are almost entirely
responsible for the family and its
sustenance, and it is often such additional
sources of income that help them take the
family through lean periods. 
Political struggles
Women of fishing communities have been
active in political struggles. The issues
they have mobilized around have
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differed. In Chile, for example, women
have been active in the struggle against
individual transferable quotas (ITQs); in
Peru and Brazil, they have campaigned for
better access to social security; and in
Mexico, against pollution by oil
companies. 
In addition, women, as everywhereelse, are entirely responsible for thecare and nurture of the family. Where
the men stay away fishing for long
periods, as in North Chile, women run the
household in the absence of their
husbands. They are important actors in
the fishing community and also in
maintaining social networks and the
culture of the community.
Why then does the work of women
continue to be invisible? It was in this
context that the workshop saw several
interesting and thought-provoking
discussions on gender issues. There were
many debates on what the concept of
gender actually was or meant, and how
this conceptual understanding could be
translated into practical initiatives. There
were, as can be expected, several different
positions.
There was consensus that women have
always been important in the fisheries and
in fishing communities. They have always
formed the core around which family and
community life has been organized.
However, on several other issues, there
were debates and discussions, with
different positions and many questions
emerging from the participants.
One position articulated by a participant
was that ‘gender’ is very much a concept
introduced from the West. Traditional
societies in many parts of the developing
world are based on relations of
complementarity, where both men and
women perform different, but
complementary, roles. In indigenous
societies, the sea is seen as a woman, as a
source of life, and there is respect for both.
These societies are based on a respect for
women and nature. There is no concept of
inequality and competition in relations
between men and women; rather, the
emphasis is on oneness and
complementarity. However,
modernization and the influence of other
cultures, have modified these positive
features. The need, therefore, is to value or
own culture, and to revive it. 
However, the position of many others
differed. Some felt it is important to
recognize that women are discriminated
against in many ways within our
communities. While men and women
may be born with the same potential, they
do not have the same opportunities in life.
Women face more obstacles. Men tend to
have more power within the family and
community, and this has been used and
abused, sometimes taking the form of
violence within the family. This kind of
violence seemed to be common, and as
one of the participants from Mexico put it,
“violence will never end since our
children are being raised in it. They will
imitate their fathers.”
It was also recognized that the work of
women, especially within the household,
has not been valued. There is need to
change this perception and to ascribe
value to this work. 
It is as important, though, to be cautious
of creating conflicts between men and
women over differences in perspective on
gender issues. There was also some
concern about professionals, who may not
have the same perspective, working with
fishing communities on gender issues, as
this could lead to divisions within the
community. Discussions on such issues
need to take place within a larger context
of affirming the culture and identity of
coastal fishing communities, and of
strengthening these communities. It
should take place within a context of
creating a new type of society, which
values the labour and role of women.
Another position closely connected to this
emphasized the creation of a society based
on a respect for women and nature. 
In general, there was a commitment and
receptiveness among the participants to
gender issues within their own contexts.
Several participants spoke of the work
they had already initiated along similar
lines. 
Verbal concern
However, as one pointed out with some
bitterness, the issue may remain a merely
verbal concern, with little actual
implementation taking place. According
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to her, some colleagues talk of gender, but
when they come to power, they do not
create a space for women fishworkers
within the organization. The projects they
pursue have nothing to do with women.
Practice, not talk, is important, she
stressed. 
In the same vein, another participant
stressed that increasing the participation
of women should also mean creating the
spaces within organizations to discuss
issues that are of concern to women, and
in which they are the subjects. Women
should not be seen merely as agents
supporting the agendas of their men. One
participant cautioned about the way
mainstream agencies are interpreting
gender in fisheries issues. 
These are often reduced to the need for
increasing women’s economic
participation in the fishery, without an
understanding of the larger social context.
To strengthen the participation of women,
the promotion of their role in aquaculture
is being mooted as one answer. It was
generally agreed that this was a
reductionist approach. 
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These proposals are geared to increase, as
much as possible, the role of women in the
fisheries sector, to grant them recognition and
participation, to reinforce the visibility and
political power of artisanal fishing communities,
and to search for socially just and responsible
strategies for fisheries development. 
The proposals were classified into the following
categories:
1. Information and Analysis
Work towards a detailed collation and
systematization of data and analyses
concerning fishing communities, with specific
reference to gender relations. The data and
analyses must be shared between communities
and organizations. 
National co-ordinating committees should be
formed to carry out this analysis. Those
undertaking the assessment must work out a
proposal for participatory analysis to be
undertaken in different regions, with the
objective of identifying:
• the status of women in the fishing com-
munities (coastal and riverine)
• their activities, both in the public and
private (domestic) sphere; 
• the impact of existing pressures on fish-
ing communities, especially with rela-
tion to the life of women.
2. Stimulation and Participation
Facilitate, stimulate and increase the
participation of women within the fisheries and
in fishing communities, through a combination
of actions and events. These programmes
must provide a forum for women to meet and to
evolve methods for ensuring their participation.
They must open up spaces for women, in their
daily life and in professional and community
organizations.
Facilitate discussions on fisheries organizations
and on promoting the participation of women in
them.
Stimulate and guarantee the presence, and
effective participation of, women, as well as
their proposals and demands, in the national
and international activities of fishworkers.
Facilitate the creation of women’s departments
within fishworker organizations, and promote
the opening up of spaces within these
organizations, which would help women define
and defend their interests and needs.
All these actions should aim to:
• highlight the contribution of women
within the fisheries sector and within
community life;
• facilitate the legal recognition of women
workers in this sector;
• take measures against the exploitation
suffered by women in the workplace. 
• ensure that the demands and the inter-
ests of women are taken into considera-
tion in public policies, employment and
income-generation programmes, educa-
tional programmes, training, credit and
health programmes.
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The discussions were by no means
conclusive. They raised many issues and
questions. In all probability, the process
represents but one step in what is no
doubt a long and continuing process of
exploring such issues. 
Overall, however, the following broad
consensus emerged:
• the work and roles of women
within the fisheries and within
fishing communities have
historically been, and continue to
be, important, though often
invisible and undervalued; 
• there is a need to valorize the work
and labour of women, and to
recognize this as an important part
of the productive chain within
family enterprises. This may
involve redefining what is seen as
fisheries;
• however, these efforts need to take
place within an overall context of
strengthening and affirming the
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• contribute towards making the relation-
ship between women and men more
just, so that both have access to the
means to aid their personal, profes-
sional, familial and cultural fulfilment. 
• contribute, at the same time, towards
reducing domestic violence.
3. Education and Training
Facilitate training programmes that enable
fishing communities themselves to carry out
surveys, and document their work and
activities, so as to have at their disposal
permanent means to aid and evaluate their
work.
Encourage the conduct of training programmes
for communities, from the perspective of
gender, among other issues.
Popularize the Chilean and Brazilian
experience, where the effort is towards the
generation of information which aids the
fishworker movement.
Develop the gender focus within the sector.
Collect and share information on fisheries and
policies relating to fisheries.
4. Sharing of Experience
Facilitate the establishment of a permanent
working group which allows for an exchange of
experiences.
Promote alliances with other sectors in civil
society so that the fisheries sector comes to be
accepted as an important social entity. 
Seek an exchange of experiences with relation
to areas reserved for artisanal fisheries,
highlighting the role of women in the
management of these areas.
Build up relations and exchange with other
organizations (of workers, farmers, educational
entities, etc.) which have more experience on
gender issues. 
Promote ways by which women from the
fisheries sectors can be present at, and
participate in, international and national events
pertaining to women.
Encourage the setting up of forums and
exchanges among women in the coastal and
riverine areas.
5. Judicial Landmarks and Public Policies
for Fisheries
Seek a review of legislation that defines a
fishworker as one who engages only in
fish-capture activities. 
Seek a review of fisheries legislation from a
gender perspective.
Collaborate in redefining the significance of the
term ’artisanal fisheries’ in such a manner that
there exists a common understanding of it,
taking into consideration the differences
between countries and continents.
Seek to define the concept of artisanal fisheries
and of artisanal fishworkers, sharing
experiences with other countries. 
Promote the recognition by governments of
women fishworkers, seaweed and shellfish
collectors, vendors and traders, makers of
fishing equipment, etc. Ensure that this
recognition has an impact on public policies.
Ensure the rights of women fishworkers to
social security (unemployment insurance and
other forms of social security).
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way of life and cultural identity of
coastal communities, and on
fostering mutual respect between
men and women. There is a need
to be wary of triggering a divisive
conflict within the community; 
• women’s participation in
fishworker organizations should
be seen as vital in not just
supporting issues important to
men. There are issues that are
specific to women that need to be
addressed too. The role of women
should not be seen as
complementary, but as an issue in
its own right.
Participants agreed to work together on
gender issues. A set of proposals for
follow-up actions was finalized (see box).
The participants also proposed the
creation of a group, with representatives
from each of the countries present, to see
through the implementation of the
proposals. 
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This report has been filed by
Chandrika Sharma (icsf@vsnl.com),
Programme Associate of ICSF, who
was one of the organizers of the
workshop
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Satellite-based vessel monitoring systems
Beam it to me, Fishie!
Space-age satellite technology has all the potential 
to become an important management tool in fisheries
Satellite technology is useful for theexploitation and exploration ofmarine living resources in a variety
of ways. Remote sensing techniques
improve our understanding about the
seas and oceans in general, but also more
specifically about abundance and
distribution of target stocks. Satellites are
also increasingly used for two-way
communication between ship and shore
or between ships. Many of the larger
fishing operators depend on this to
optimize their business strategies. The
focus of this article is on relatively recent
developments in using satellite
technology for the monitoring and
surveillance of fishing vessels. 
So-called ’satellite-based vessel
monitoring systems (VMSs)’ provide
management authorities with near
real-time information about fishing
vessels and their activities. In most cases,
this information is limited to the vessel’s
identity and location, but a range of other
data could be transmitted as well. This
could be information that is ’voluntarily’
provided by the master of the ship (e.g.
catch reports) or information that is
automatically generated. For instance,
on-board sensors could disclose the
vessel’s speed and direction, the
operational status of the engine or the
hydraulic boom used for fishing gear, or
the sea temperature and salinity in the
vessel’s vicinity. The latter option is
already in operation in the Maldives, for
instance.
All vessels covered by a satellite-based
VMS are equipped with an automatic
location communicator (ALC). Sometimes
referred to as a ’blue box’, an ALC
ascertains its position through a fully
integrated global positioning system (GPS)
and transmits this and other selected
information via a satellite to a fisheries
monitoring centre (FMC) on shore. Many
alternative applications are possible. The
main providers of satellites are Inmarsat,
Argos and Eutelsat.
Depending on the manufacturer and
satellite system used, the cost of an ALC
currently ranges between US$1,500 to
US$3,500. Data entry terminals (if
necessary) range from US$400 to US$1500.
The latest types of ALCs are smaller than a
soccer ball. Some are even fully
self-contained, with their own power
supply and thus suitable for artisanal
fisheries. The amount of training needed
to operate ALCs depends on the type of
information to be transmitted. If this is
limited to automatically generated
information (e.g. identity, location, speed
and direction), only very little instruction
is necessary. More training is required
with extended applications, for instance
the transmission of catch reports.
However, it can be expected that
technological innovations will continue to
simplify operation. 
Data on the vessel’s identity and location
allow the FMC to check compliance with
closed areas or seasons, or restricted
fishing effort through fixed fishing days.
A vessel’s speed and navigation patterns
often reveals a so-called ’fishing
signature’, which indicates it is engaged in
fishing. This can even be used for
multiple-licence (multiple-species)
fishing, as most types of fishing have a
more or less unique fishing signature. 
Sophisticated features
Features of sophisticated systems such as
the one operated by the South Pacific
Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA), include
remote ’polling’ where the frequency of
vessel position reports can be varied at
wish, and ’decision engines’ which
automatically carry out the polling
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function and generate recommendations
on the necessary steps of enforcement.
The advantages of satellite-basedVMSs have appealed to manyfisheries management authorities
at the national and regional level. Not only
do most developed States already use or
intend to use this technology, more and
more developing States are following suit.
Regional fisheries management
organizations in the Central and Western
Pacific, in the Atlantic (three different
organizations), and in the Southern Ocean
already have the systems in place or have
installed pilot programmes. Many more
are expected to follow. These
developments indicate that the obligatory
use of ALCs is likely to be introduced in all
major industrial fisheries within the next
few years.
The popularity of this new technology
relies, to an important extent, on its
proven utility in two key tasks: data
gathering and ensuring compliance with
management objectives. It is evident that
satellite-based VMSs enables the
compilation of a wealth of data on a near
real-time basis and, at the same time, it is
significantly more economical, compared
to traditional means of surveillance by
boat or aircraft. The integration of this
information with data obtained through
other sources will ultimately create a
sophisticated and powerful tool for
enhancing not only compliance but
fisheries management in general. 
At the same time, care should be taken not
to regard this technology as an absolute
necessity in all situations or a panacea to
all management problems. The ’high-tech’
character might be so alluring that a blind
eye is turned to the technology’s
shortcomings. The first thing
policymakers should, therefore, do is to
assess whether, in the specific
circumstances, a satellite-based VMS is the
most cost-effective compared to other
means of data gathering and ensuring
compliance. The need for such an
assessment addresses essentially the same
concerns as those on the suitability of
management through individually
transferable quotas (ITQs). Previous issues
of SAMUDRA Report clearly revealed the
need for a balanced approach, instead of
either regarding ITQs as ideal solutions or
dismissing them as utter failures. 
Assessing the cost-effectiveness of
satellite-based VMSs should, among other
things, take full account of the system’s
principal limitations:
• vessels not equipped with ALCs, or
whose ALCs are not functioning
properly, can not be located.
Complementary means of
surveillance, such as by boats or
aircraft, will, therefore, always be
necessary. Alternatives are
over-the-horizon radar (OHR) or
remote sensing through synthetic
aperture radar (SAR). The
feasibility of the latter option is
currently being investigated by
Indonesia with the help of Argos;
• traditional means of surveillance
will, at any rate, generally be
required to bring or order
offenders to port and thus ensure
prosecution; and 
• a satellite-based VMS is most
effective in conjunction with
management based on measures
such as closed areas or seasons, or
restricted fishing days. 
A noticeable distinction in regulatory
approaches that are currently pursued by
States and regional organizations is that
between imposing satellite-based VMSs on
individual fisheries or, instead, more
generally on all fishing vessels or those
above a certain size. It is, therefore, very
pertinent to ask whether a satellite-based
VMS is in general suitable for small-scale or
artisanal fisheries. This should be assessed
by taking into account a number of factors,
including:
• the size of the regulatory area, the
part in which the actual fishing
takes place and the topography of
the coastline;
• the type of stocks and their level of
exploitation;
• the type and size of fishery, i.e.
industrial/artisanal or
domestic/foreign;
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• the nature and extent of
infringements and the
effectiveness of flag State control
(if relevant);
• other social and economic
considerations, such as the human
and financial resources available
for enforcement in relation to the
fisheries’ revenue in social and
economic terms; 
• the (lack of) support of
stakeholders;
• the potential for successful
co-operation with other States at a
regional or sub-regional level; and
• the political will and commitment
to make optimal use of the chosen
VMS.
This non-exhaustive list underscores the
need for a tailored and balanced
approach. At the same time, it seems safe
to say that satellite-based VMSs would, in
general, be more appropriate for
industrial than for small-scale and
artisanal fisheries, as the latter commonly
involve a large number of fishers, mixed
gear and landing points. But the reference
made above to the latest model of a
self-contained ALC indicates that new
technology can resolve initial
impediments. This implies that
satellite-based VMSs will become suitable
for more and more types of fisheries. 
One of the factors included in the second
list above is the significance of support by
stakeholders. Crucial in this context is the
extent to which confidentiality and
security of information is guaranteed. In
many fisheries, the possibility that near
real-time location and/or catch data ends
up in the hands of (non-participating)
competitors is bound to have enormous
impact on acceptance and, if already in
operation, on compliance and
co-operation. 
Confidentiality and security risks exist in
every phase of transmission and will, in
general, increase when more parties share
VMS information. All those
involved—States, companies and
(satellite-) organizations alike—should,
therefore, exercise the utmost diligence.
This may, for instance, require the
enactment of legislation to counter
breaches of confidentiality or security.
Broadened support
In certain situations, but particularly for
small-scale or artisanal fisheries, support
by stakeholders could be broadened
through providing ALCs free of charge.
Moreover, stakeholders should be
thoroughly informed about the way in
which satellite-based VMSs function and
how they contribute towards fair
 
 T
e
ch
n
ology
SAMUDRA AUGUST 2000 31
competition and optimizing fisheries
management. 
Evidently, efforts to secure widesupport should eventually becomplemented by a solid legal
framework to deal with regulatory
violations detected by satellite-based VMS
and attempts to tamper with ALCs. New
technology also raises the issue of its
evidentiary value in legal proceedings.
Although several legal hurdles have
already been taken, cases recently
instituted in Australia and the US are
expected to address the question whether
a prosecution can rely on VMS data
exclusively, without subsidiary sightings
by boats or aircraft. An affirmative answer
to this question is expected to lead to a
wider use of VMS technology. 
In designing a legal framework, a fisheries
management authority will also have to
abide by international law. This is
particularly relevant for the scope of
application of a satellite-based VMS. From
a legal perspective, there is a wide margin
of discretion in relation to domestic ships
and foreign ships with fishing licences.
Domestic ships can be asked to install
ALCs and have them switched on, in
principle, anywhere on the globe. Foreign
ships with licences can only be asked to do
this when they are in the maritime zones
of coastal States. Unfortunately,
international law does not grant coastal
States the power to impose similar
requirements on foreign ships that merely
want to pass through a coastal State’s
maritime zones. Such ships may therefore
still be tempted to engage in illegal fishing.
However, international law is not static.
Broader acceptance of information
sharing in general and specifically
through a widespread use of
satellite-based VMSs will certainly have an
impact on this limitation. 
In conclusion, satellite-based VMSs have
all the potential of contributing to more
sophisticated and cost-effective fisheries
management. Despite these obvious
advantages, a thorough assessment
should be made to ascertain if a
satellite-based VMS is, under the specific
circumstances, the most cost-effective,
compared to other forms of monitoring
and surveillance. Finally, in designing the
regulatory framework for a satellite-based
VMS, account should be taken of a wide
range of factors, including the need for
consistency with international law.
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This article is by Erik Jaap Molenaar
(E.Molenaar@law.uu.nl), a Research
Associate at the Netherlands
Institute for the Law of the Sea,
Utrecht University
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Aquaculture
Shrimp farms or shrimps harm?
Myths abound about how the farmed shrimp industry 
can alleviate rural poverty, as the case of Thailand shows 
During the last two decades,shrimp aquaculture has becomean increasingly important
alternative to ocean-caught shrimp.  By
the late 1990s, roughly a quarter of the
world’s 2.5 million tonnes of shrimp came
from farms, up from just one-twentieth in
the early 1980s.
Globally, the farmed shrimp industry,
which represents a substantial component
of the increasingly important aquaculture,
has often borne the brunt of criticisms
especially about environmental damage.
In fact, whether from the North or the
South, concerned NGOs have often, quite
rightly, campaigned against the
industry’s negative impacts upon
mangrove systems, its salinization of
waterways and its transformation of
coastal ecologies.
Shrimp farming in countries such as India,
Indonesia, Thailand and Ecuador has
developed because of the relative
cheapness of coastal land, the poor
regulatory frameworks governing land
use and title, the eagerness of local and
foreign elites to profit, and the seemingly
insatiable desire for shrimp among
consumers in countries like Japan, the US
and the European Union .
Yet, what has been remarkably absent
from much of the analysis of the shrimp
industry is an assessment of the labour
conditions in the industry. The boosters of
shrimp farming, be they government
agencies, multilateral banks or
transnational corporations, wax lyrical
about the benefits which accrue to shrimp
farmers in the developing world. 
However, shrimp farm owners only
constitute a small proportion of the total
numbers of participants in the sector.
Besides the industry’s environmental
impact, one must ask whether people
have benefited from the increased
opportunities for employment shrimp
farming has created in rural areas?
A case study of Thailand might answer
this question, apart from providing some
background to the circumstances of the
industry’s development. Thailand
became the world’s leading exporter of
farmed shrimp in the mid-1990s. It is also
the home of the developing world’s
leading transnational agribusiness
company, Charoen Pokphand , otherwise
known as the CP Group.
Thailand’s shrimp industry grew through
the co-ordinated efforts of the World
Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the
CP Group and Thai government agencies,
all of whom helped construct an
institutional and infrastructural
framework to facilitate rapid expansion,
minimal regulation and maximum
profits. Tax incentives, tariff-free
technology imports, income tax-free
holidays, and export credits formed part
of the generous packages offered to Thai
and foreign companies setting up
operations in Thailand’s rural areas.
Within a short time, factories were
springing up in coastal rural areas to
process the shrimp produced on
surrounding farms. Each factory
employed upwards of 2,000 workers.  
More jobs
Farms also became sites of employment,
and in the 10 years between 1985 and 1995,
the occurrence of wage labour rose from
14 per cent to 33 per cent in all the farms.
By the end of the 1990s, farmed shrimp
generated over US$1 billion in exports,
although this was down from a peak of
US$2 billion in 1995. This made shrimp one
of the most valuable of Thailand’s exports
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and an industry central to the economy.
One might think that with its high value,
this would transfer into better conditions
for those working in the industry, but one
would be wrong.
Workers who are employed onfarms are often locals whoseprevious occupations are no
longer viable. For example, on the eastern
coasts of southern Thailand, many shrimp
farm workers were previously small-scale
fisherfolk, who obtained most of their
catch within the 3-km coastal zone.
Shrimp farms, however, have caused
significant pollution through the silting of
tidal zones and the increased presence of
organic matter. The net effect has been to
reduce coastal fisheries and thus damage
the possibilities for local fisherfolk,
generally meaning they must seek
alternative sources of income. 
But making the move to working on a
shrimp farm is not necessarily an
advancement.  Firstly, most shrimp is
grown over a 4-month period, with a one-
or two-month break in between each crop,
during which there is no employment.
Secondly, continuous wages during the
crop depend on successful harvests, and
with the very high rates of crop loss in the
industry, there are no guarantees of
income.  Thirdly, the rates of bankruptcy
at the farm level are very high, and there
is often little security of employment, with
workers often changing farms every year.
More importantly, even if all the right
conditions are met and there is a good
harvest, farm workers, if their incomes
were to be spread out over a single year,
would not even receive Thailand’s legal
minimum wage (about US$4 a day).
However, the main source of employment
generated by the shrimp industry is in the
large processing factories. However,
rather than ’liberating’ people through
wage labour, these factories can actually
reinforce existing inequalities, as well as
create new ones.
The factories are industrial plants whose
workforce is entirely female. The work
conditions involve standing all day, with
workers having to seek permission to go
to the toilet. Management of the factories
is quite clear on the reasons behind the
all-female labour force: they are cheaper
than male workers.  While workers
generally receive the minimum wages,
they must pay for their own transport to
the factories. There are no unions,
overtime is compulsory, all hiring is
casual and there are no employment
guarantees.
New opportunities
Those supporting the industry have
argued that by employing women, the
factories are, in fact, giving women an
income they once never had, and are
allowing them to pursue new
opportunities. Yet this is only one side of
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the story. Surveys done at the factories
have found that around two-thirds of the
women are married, with children.  The
immediate consequences of their
employment is not greater freedom but
actually a reinforcement of the gendered
division of labour which, under these
arrangements, expects women to perform
child-rearing duties and provide
additional family income.
None of this takes into account theundocumented workers whoseposition within the farmed
shrimp industry is even worse.  In
southern Thailand, there are factories
where Burmese workers are housed in
locked-in conditions (that is, they can not
leave the factory premises), where
average wages are half the legal minimum
and where strike activity has been met
with violence and harassment.  
Clearly, the picture of employment in the
farmed shrimp industry in Thailand is not
one of simple improvement in people’s
livelihoods. There are complex and
contradictory issues at play. Yet, it is
obvious that new forms of exploitation
have emerged. In an industry where
significant export revenues and profits
have accrued to transnational companies,
such as Charoen Pokphand and
Mitsubishi, and to local elites, it is time
that increasing attention was drawn to the
means by which such wealth can be
redistributed more equitably. While the
environmental impact of shrimp farming
will continue to garner campaigns and
protests, the conditions and future of the
shrimp industry’s workers should now be
of equal concern to interested parties.  
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Distant-water workers
Another Filipino story
The experience of seven Filipino workers on 
board Taiwanese longliners is a tale of breach of contract
All seven of them come from thenorthern Luzon province of thePhilippines, but until they met at
the Manila office of Cristie Fernandez, the
main recruiting agent in the country for
Taiwanese longliners, they had not
known one another. 
Jerson Hipol and Ronel Agtang each have
a bachelor’s degree in Marine Transport,
while Teodulo Aban holds a degree in
Marine Engineering, apart from having
done a year’s apprenticeship at sea.
Rufino Pinacate and Alfredo Ramos have
a diploma in electronics and automobile
engineering respectively. The remaining
two, Arthur Umalos and Domingo Soliva,
however, were farm hands. 
Teodulo is 23, Rufino, 27 and Domingo is
28. All the others are 25 years old. Rufino
is the only one who is married—his wife
works in a factory in Manila. He also has
three children being brought up in his
village by his wife’s sister. 
These Filipinos had to pay different
amounts of money—ranging from 18,000
to 25,000 pesos—to be recruited as
fishermen. The better the qualification, the
more you pay. A couple of them used their
savings or family money to pay up, while
the others had to borrow at high interest
rates either from banks or from
moneylenders. The loans have to be paid
back on their return on completion of their
contracts with the longliners.
None of them had any prior experience in
fishing. They had different motives for
joining the fishing industry. The
technically trained ones wanted to gain
experience at sea and graduate to the
merchant navy. They thought fishing
would give them such an opportunity.
The farm hands wanted to be masters of
their own destiny. They wanted to make
some money, return to their respective
villages and invest their savings in
tractors. They would then make a living
renting out their tractors. 
Their contracts, all individually signed,
were for a period of three years.  A
contract typically offered them a monthly
salary of US$200 to work on board Jin Long
Fa, a Taiwanese longliner. (The exception
was Ramos, who had a contract to work
on Ta Fu 3.) In addition, there would be
free meals. Coffee, tea and toiletries,
however, had to be bought with their own
money. The contract clearly laid down the
nature of their work: to put in 18 to 22
hours at a stretch in tuna longlining. They
were not entitled to any leave unless the
captain, at his own discretion, gave them
an off-period. 
Alfredo Ramos, who left the Philippines
on 2 June 1997 and was flown further to
Mauritius on 5 June, had to join the crew
of Jin Long Fa, although his contract was
for Ta Fu 3. The others were flown from
Manila to Singapore on 5 June, and, after
three days, they were further flown to
Mauritius to join the crew of Ta Fu 3,
instead of Jin Long Fa. In the meantime, all
of them had to surrender their signed
contracts to the representative of Victor
Lim, the broker of the fishing vessels in
Singapore. 
Many responsibilities
The Filipino lads were trained in
longlining on board by four other
Filipinos, who subsequently left the vessel
on completion of their contracts. Their
main job was to bait and pay the line; to
retrieve it after a gap of seven hours; and
to remove the fish to the hold. There were
additional responsibilities such as
attaching/removing the baited line
to/from the main line, throwing the
buoys, gutting and gilling the fish,
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maintaining the temperature of the fish
hold, and locating, with the aid of a
searchlight and radio buoys, the snapped
lines. There was some degree of
automation to pay the line. 
After putting in a year of service onTa Fu 3, those on board weretransferred, that too at mid-sea, to
Jin Long Fa. The captain of Ta Fu 3 told
them that the captain of Jin Long Fa was the
brother of the master (meaning, the
owner) of his vessel and assured them that
they will be paid for the months they had
worked on Ta Fu 3.  The transfer
apparently was because the captain of Ta
Fu 3 had completed the tenure with the
master and the vessel had to return to
Taiwan. Also, it was prohibited to return
to Taiwan with foreign workers on board.
While transferring six Filipinos to Jin Long
Fa, six Chinese workers were exchanged
for Ta Fu 3. Also, all the equipment on
board Ta Fu 3 was transferred to Jin Long
Fa.
The captains on both vessels and the first
engineer of Ta Fu 3 were Taiwanese. All
others were either Chinese or Filipinos.
There were 26 people working on board,
including the captain; the first and second
engineers; the first and second bosons; the
cook; and the crew, numbering about 20.
This comprised 13 Chinese (mainland)
and seven Filipinos on Jin Long Fa, and 14
Chinese and six Filipinos on Ta Fu 3. The
Chinese were younger and less
experienced than the Filipinos and could
be bossed over on board Jin Long Fa. They
were also less paid, about US$120 a month.
On board Ta Fu 3, the pecking order,
however, was different because the more
experienced hands were the Chinese and
the Filipinos were the ones who were
bossed over! This was in spite of the fact
that the Chinese were earning less than the
Filipinos. There were occasional brawls
between the two nationalities, which they
attributed to “small misunderstandings”.
The vessel would carry about 50 tonnes of
mackerel and 30 tonnes of squid as bait,
either in fresh or frozen form. (The
mackerel would be in 10-kg cartons, and
the squid in 15-kg cartons). The baiting
was done according to the instructions of
the captain and was implemented by the
boson. Both mackerel and squid were
simultaneously baited and the order of
baiting would depend on the captain.
Sometimes, it would be two hooks in a
row with mackerel, followed by two with
squid. Or it would be two with mackerel,
followed by four with squid. 
Time at sea
The fishing was either in the cold waters
south of Australia or in the warm waters
off Somalia. Ta Fu 3 would also fish off
Oman.  Most often, before Ta Fu 3
returned to Taiwan, both vessels would be
fishing more or less in the same waters.
The time spent at sea would vary from
four to seven months, depending on cold
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or warm waters. In warm waters, the 50-m
vessel would carry about 3,000 hooks,
and, in colder waters, about 3,600. 
The cold waters were more difficultfor fishing because the sea wouldbe rough and there would be more
fish to catch, which meant a lot more of
work. The main species caught in the
colder waters were bigeye tuna. In warm
waters, albacore, blue marlin, and
swordfish were the main species caught. 
Normally, fishing trips to warmer waters
were longer. At least every 60 days, the
catch would be transferred mid-sea to
another reefer ship. Re-fuelling was done
at sea in warm waters, about twice every
six to seven months.  In cold waters,
re-fuelling was not done because of the
rough sea. There were times when the
crew had to work continuously for two
days at a stretch, but such instances were
rare. If the catch was poor, they got more
time to rest. There was more work (and
fish!) and less sleep in the colder waters.
After each fishing trip, the vessel with the
crew would spend about a month in
Mauritius.
On completion of the contract, the
Filipinos wanted to collect their salaries
for three years and get back home. When
they approached the captain, they were
informed their salaries had been paid to
the agent in Singapore. But on contacting
the agent, they learnt that the master
(owner of the vessel) had paid no money!
On advice from an anonymous
well-wisher, who works at the agent’s
office in Singapore, they sought the help
of the Apostolat de la Mer, Port Louis,
Mauritius, on 11 May 2000. 
They had no complaints about the
working conditions on board the fishing
vessel. The food was good and sufficient.
They got rice gruel for breakfast with fried
fish or fried peanuts. For lunch and
dinner, they were served fish, chicken,
vegetables and rice. In fact, every six
hours, food was served. The fourth meal,
however, would be light. The timing of the
meals depended on when the fishing
operations for the day would begin. If it
started at 3 a.m., food, in the form of light
refreshments, would be served at 6 a.m.
and proper breakfast at 9 a.m.
Aboard  Jin Long Fa, the crew was divided
into three groups (say, A, B and C). Each
of these groups had two Filipinos. Ramos,
the seventh Filipino, was always in charge
of the fish hold. The composition of the
groups was not changed during their
tenure on board.  Two groups would
work for three hours each, while the third
would rest for six hours. The groups took
turns so that everybody got an equal
chance to rest. 
Different grouping
On board Ta Fu 3, the group configuration
was different. They were divided into two
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groups of eight each, and each worked for
a shift of seven hours. The third group,
comprising four (two Chinese and two
Filipinos), were assigned to the freezer, to
gut and store fish, unlike in Jin Long Fa,
where everybody had to do everything,
except for Ramos.  
The operation of the main line wasautomated. The captain wouldinstruct the crew to wake him up
when the fishing operations commenced.
If the fishing day began at 3 a.m., group A
crew would throw the baited hooks into
the sea for three hours, followed by group
B for another three hours. While group A
worked, group B could rest and, after their
shift to pay the line, Group A could rest for
three hours.  In the meantime, group C
would rest for the entire six hours. 
The captain would give his full attention
to fishing operations when the lines were
being paid out, to make sure that the lines
were not getting entangled and also to
make sure that there was no obstruction in
the form of a boat. Once the line was paid
out, there would be an hour’s break for
breakfast when the three groups would
eat together. 
The first part of the job was over. The
second part then began, which took
longer, about 18 hours. The operation has
a cycle:  work-standby-rest-work or
rest-standby-work-rest. At a given point
in time, there will be 15 workers on the
deck, six retrieving the line, and nine
standing by. 
The first shift after paying the line is for
three hours, say, from 10 a.m. to 1 p.m.,
and the subsequent ones for a period of
two- to two-and-a-half-hours. The first
shift is longer because the group has been
resting longer hours.  Also, during the
first shift, the first boson will sleep for the
entire duration of three hours. In the
retrieving operation, two of the groups are
further divided into two,  say A1, A2, and
B1, B2, those who are the standby and
those who can rest. The group that could
sleep for six hours remains as an
undivided group. 
After breakfast, at 10 a.m., group C, which
had been resting for six hours, will start
retrieving the line. A2 and B (both B1, B2)
will be the standby, while A1 would be
given rest. The standby can not rest.  From
1 p.m. to 3 p.m., while B (both B1, B2)
retrieves the line, A1 and C will be the
standby, and A2 will be given rest. From
3 p.m. to 5 p.m., group A (both A1, A2) will
retrieve the line, while B2 is the standby
and C and B1 would rest. From 5 p.m. to
5.30 p.m. is the break for refreshments.
From 5.30 p.m. to 7.30 or 8 p.m., while C
works, A (both A1, A2) and B1 would be
the standby, and B2 would rest. From 8
p.m. to 10 p.m., while B (both B1, B2)
works, C will be the standby together with
A2, and A1 will be given rest. From 10 p.m.
to midnight, A (both A1, A2) will work, B
(both B1, B2) will be the standby and C will
rest. From 12.30 p.m. to 1 a.m. there is
another break for refreshments. From 1
a.m. to 3 a.m., C will work. B (both B1, B2)
and A2 will be standby and A1 will be
given rest.  And the new cycle would start
from 3 a.m. This time it is the turn of B to
sleep six hours. At least once in three days,
each of the group got a six-hour rest.
All the crew had individual beds with
mattresses. There was also an electric fan.
In cold waters, warm clothing was
provided. The only hazard that they
encountered during the trip was with
hooks occasionally getting caught in their
fingers, for which the captain would
administer medication. 
If there was no fish or if there were many
dolphins in the fishing ground, the
captain will move to a new ground, as
dolphins eat up most of the fish. The
workers would then get a break of two to
five hours, the cruising time between the
two fishing grounds. However, they were
not permitted to sleep during this time.
The Filipinos enjoyed their time on board
the fishing vessel. Asked to comment on
what they liked about working on board a
fishing vessel, they said, “ We enjoyed the
bonhomie on board, especially when there
was no fish to be caught!” 
Contacts established
The Apostolat de La Mer has established
contact with Lee First Marine, the ship
agent in Mauritius, and negotiations were
undertaken. Contacts were also
established with Victor Lim of the Step-up
Marine Enterprise in Singapore. The
fishermen left Mauritius for the
Philippines on Sunday, 21 May. Ramos
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was paid for the entire period of his
contract. The others, who spent two years
on board Ta Fu 3, got only one year’s
salary, the period for which they had
worked on board Jin Long Fa. They were
not paid for the period they had worked
on board Ta Fu 3. Aladdin Villacorti, the
Ambassador of the Philippines in South
Africa, who is responsible for Mauritius,
has promised to mediate and to ensure,
through the Philippine Embassy in
Singapore, that the full salaries will be
paid. The Filipinos are also yet to get
certificates that they have worked on
board a fishing vessel for three years, an
important requirement to join the
merchant ships. Meanwhile, the seaman’s
jobs and the tractors of their dreams will
have to wait as well. 
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Newfoundland
Island notes
Although the Fogo Island Co-operative is a 
successful venture, women members are still unjustly treated
Since the late 1960s, Fogo Island, onthe northeast coast of the Canadianprovince of Newfoundland and
Labrador, has been the site of a
remarkably successful fishing
co-operative which serves six island
communities, home to over 2,500 people.
Over the years, the Fogo Island
Co-operative has made it possible for
people to continue to live on the island,
depending on the inshore and nearshore
fisheries for income and employment.  
The co-operative was always seen as both
an economic and a social institution.
During the 1980s it was able to expand the
work opportunities for islanders by
developing fish and crab plants, which
came to employ up to 500 women and
men.  Today it runs a plant for filleting and
freezing groundfish as well as capelin,
lumpfish roe, herring, and other products;
another for crab processing; and, as of July
2000, one for shrimp processing.
Both the fishers and the fish-plant workers
have the opportunity to be members and
hence owners of the co-operative. The
fish-plant workers have resisted efforts to
bring them into a union that represents
almost all the fish-plant workers and
fishers, in the rest of Newfoundland and
Labrador. “We are all in the same boat”
this seems to have been the ideology. 
However, there is often tension between
management and the fish-plant workers,
and even more so, between the plant
workers and the large-scale longliner
fishers. 
These fishers are heavily represented on
the co-operative’s board of directors and
have a strong say in its policies, including
fish plant policy.  The fact that their large
vessels, equipped for turbot, crab and
shrimp fishing, supply the plants with
most of the raw product upon which
fish-plant jobs depend, plays a major role
in the story that follows.
In July 1999, a group of women met at a
local motel with a representative of the
province’s Human Rights Commission,
upset and angered because each of them
had lost her job at the co-operative’s crab
plant. The reason was a new hiring policy:
it was based on ability and seniority, but
“with preference given to family
members” of fishers who delivered all of
their fish and shellfish to the co-operative,
rather than to other buyers.  The July 1999
meeting, and others, resulted in a formal
hearing at the end of March 2000. As of
this writing (the end of July 2000), no
decision has been reached in the matter,
and most of the women are no longer
working for the co-operative. They are
struggling to make ends meet as low-paid
home-care workers, baby-sitters, or by
simply trying to make do with no income
of their own.
The following report of the situation
includes testimony at the March 2000
hearing as reported in the island’s
monthly newsletter, the Fogo Island Flyer.
Many of the 33 women who filed
complaints had long been co-operative
members in good standing. A typical
situation, as seen below, was where their
spouses had been small-scale inshore
fishers who shipped their lobsters
traditionally to a buyer off the island. 
Women’s problems
Another typical situation was where a
woman’s spouse or boyfriend worked on
a nearshore longliner vessel, and the
owner decided to ship his fish or crabs off
the island. Another issue was whether all
members understood and agreed with the
policy, which was brought up at a general
meeting in March. The long-standing local
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dilemma is that the co-operative depends
on the raw product of the fishers, and the
fishers thus claim some ’right’ to ask that
their own family members get special
consideration in the fish and crab plants. 
On the other hand, workers claimthe right to be judged andrewarded on the basis of their
commitment and experience (i.e.
seniority) and their ability, no matter
whom they live with and are related to.
Complaints about hiring for other
reasons—the so-called ’fishermen’s
wives’ preference—are long-standing.
Bringing the situation to a head is
increased competition with other buyers
for the fish and crabs caught by Island
fishers. 
In 1999, a large number of longliners
began to ship their catches elsewhere, in
many cases because they needed
financing to do well in the new crab and
shrimp fisheries.  The co-operative’s
board of directors can not legally force
members to sell to it.  They found another
pressure point: the jobs of fishers’ family
members. 
In the March 2000 hearing, the first
witness who took the stand was long-time
employee, Irene Nippard, who had begun
her employment with the co-operative
under its first manager, back in the early
1970s.  
Nippard stated for the court that in losing
her position, “it was as if someone
belonging to me had died.  It couldn’t
have hurt any worse.  To be employed for
so many years in the same industry and to
be let go because my husband didn’t ship
his lobster to the co-op hit me hard. I
looked forward to every spring when the
plant would be up and running, but last
year, when the plant opened and work
started, I didn’t get a call, while the rest of
my shift went in to work. It was odd
because I was on top of the seniority list
and, under normal circumstances, would
have been among the very first.  Soon the
phone started ringing and I began talking
to other workers who also didn’t get called
in  [to work]. I spoke to Pad Shea [the crab
plant manager] and he told me that I lost
my job because my husband didn’t ship
his lobster to the co-op.  I questioned him
further. He said my husband would have
to sign an agreement to sell all his lobster
to the co-op. We decided to attend the
board meeting the next morning and find
out what was going on.”
Although Nippard was upset, she
continued with her story: “ I told my
husband about the agreement and he was
willing to sign it, but I said ’no way’.  After
20 years of working with the co-op, I
shouldn’t have to do this.”  Irene also
stated, “The Fogo Island Co-op always
said that hiring was done by seniority, but
they have never done it properly.”
However, in the end, Irene was among the
few workers who had their spouses sign
the co-operative’s agreement and, as
promised, found herself back at work
within a day or two.
Daphne Bailey was next to take the stand.
Like Nippard, Bailey too felt pressured
into having her husband sign the
agreement and, when asked by her lawyer
how it made her feel, her response was, “I
felt like a nobody.  I wasn’t a person.”
Bailey too had been employed at the plant
for 21 years and stated she had no clear
understanding of the new hiring policy.
The next witness called was Doreen Keats,
an employee of almost 20 years. She stated
that she contacted management for
verification of the new policy, as her
husband is a crew member on his
brother’s longliner, which doesn’t ship to
the co-operative. Doreen stated that Kirk
Decker, manager of the plant where
Doreen has worked for almost 15 years,
acknowledged to her that “he felt as
though he was caught between a rock and
a hard place”. Keats explained that she
was forced to look for work and
eventually was employed as a home-care
worker.  
Betty Brett was next to testify. She was told
she was not on [the call-in] list either and
was told that management assumed that
her spouse/boyfriend was fishing as a
crew member aboard a vessel that did not
ship their product to the co-operative.
Brett did go to work, but only received five
to six days of employment, as her spouse
did get a berth with a longliner.
Last testimony
The final witness to be called on behalf of
the employees was Rita Penton.  Her
Ca
n
ad
a 
42 SAMUDRA AUGUST 2000
testimony was a little different, as she held
a supervisory position as a forelady, and
also because her husband was part owner
of a vessel that did not ship to the
co-operative.  
She explained that her husband andhis partner could not get financialbacking from the co-operative to
enter the new shrimp fishery and so
looked elsewhere, which meant a
commitment to deliver the shrimp
elsewhere too. She also explained exactly
how the list of workers to be called in was
created, including a new category called
“non-affiliated”, resulting in many
women being moved to the bottom of the
seniority list.  She talked about how
surprised and upset she was when she
found out that she too had lost her
seniority and job: “I was shocked at losing
my job because of something my husband
had done that I had no control over?The
plant had become my second home, my
second family, and that in the year 2000,
this should not be happening.”  
On the second day, George Lee testified
that he had been a part of the formation of
the Fogo Island Co-operative Society,
which became internationally known as
the ‘Fogo Process’ and “was a means of
educating people on solving their own
problems and furthering economic
development.” He explained that the
process involved several growing pains
all through the years, with moments of
crisis, perhaps among the worst being the
cod moratorium beginning 1992, and the
most recent being the decline in raw
material with vessels leaving the
co-operative to ship elsewhere. Lee stated,
“The fishermen who stayed around and
continued selling their catch to the co-op
have helped economic growth and have
kept the plants in operation. Fogo Island
would have had difficulty surviving if it
were not for their continued support.”
Wayne Cull, Project Co-ordinator for the
co-operative was the next to testify.
Regarding the last hiring policy, he
commented, “With approximately 20
Fogo Island boats shipping their catch
elsewhere, we were forced to do what was
in the very best interest of the co-op to
ensure its survival.”  Cull also stated, “To
accommodate members whose spouses
are supporting other businesses, we
would be helping to subsidize another
business, often at our own expense.”
The lawyer for the plant workers then
asked Cull to sum up the management
decision on hiring. Cull replied, “It was
only fair to hire workers who were full
supporters of the co-op.”
President’s testimony
Cecil Godwin, current President of the
Board of Directors, and Vice President of
the Federation of Co-operatives, was the
next to testify. He stated, “The hiring
problems have been going on for years
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and that, in an attempt to find closure to
the very festering problem, the co-op had
gone out and arranged community-based
meetings to hear from members and to
listen to their complaints and try to come
up with a solution that would be in their
best interest.”
General Manager Hugh St. Croixwas the last witness called to thestand on behalf of the
co-operative’s lawyer.  St. Croix described
the state of affairs that the business was in
[allegedly close to financial bankruptcy]
when he came to the position. He
described the low morale and the
every-present seniority issue and how it
could not be rectified to suit everyone.
Day Three saw the closing arguments
from Barry Fleming, for the Human
Rights Commission, and Christine Fagan,
for the Fogo Island Co-operative Society.
Briefly, the Human Rights Commission’s
argument was that the women workers
were discriminated against because they
were not hired because of their spouse’s
activities.  In addition, the new
“preference policy” had no rational basis
because it had nothing to do with the
efficient work of the women.  Moreover,
the co-operative was not acting in good
faith because the membership voted
down a resolution to amend the
constitution to reflect this policy but the
board of directors passed it.  “The fact is
that the ability of these workers had
nothing to do with being a family member
of a 100 per cent supporting fisherman.
Essentially, it’s a case of ’The Devil made
me do it.’  They had to secure products to
keep the plant operations going.  They
were responding to a threat by fishermen
and they wanted to ensure employment
for their families”, Fleming said.
Christine Fagan invited the court to
recognize the unique aspects of this case.
“It is a unique industry that has been
owned and operated by its members. We
heard in Mr. Cecil Godwin’s testimony
that the co-operative has a social
conscience, and that the co-operative has
delivered a service that no other entity
could have filled back then. The
fish-plants would not have survived
without the establishment of the
co-operative. Thirteen million dollars
were paid out to its employees last year,
and it doesn’t take a rocket scientist to
figure out the co-operative’s contribution
to the Island,” she said. She also discussed
the problems in plant and employee
management which had escalated during
1998, and the need to “restore fairness and
balance, and to find some sort of control
within the business and to ensure its
economic survival.”   
Although Fogo Island, a small island in
the North Atlantic, is remote, it is firmly
enmeshed in a globalized system.  In this
case, globalization and its regional and
local echoes have played a role in making
life very difficult for women whose only
income-producing opportunity, by and
large, is working in the fishery. Fogo
Island’s co-operative is an institution
created to provide some buffer to the
worst side-effects of globalization, the
displacement of people due to
overexploitation of natural resources and
the movement of capital.  As a
co-operative rather than a private
business, it can endure far more
belt-tightening and non-profit years on
behalf of its members and workers.   
More recently, the Fogo Island
Co-operative has been in the throes of
competition for raw product with
numerous other buyers, with other
communities struggling with
unemployment and failed fisheries, and
with its own members trying to make the
best of the very bad situation of the cod
moratorium of the 1990s.  It has
diversified, and its crab fishery and crab
plant helped families get through the
groundfish crisis.  However, the crab
fishery’s season gets shorter by the year,
reducing the chances that plant workers
will qualify for unemployment benefits
during the long winter off-season.  Forced
to compete on a global market, the
co-operative has invested in a new, more
efficient crab plant—with a
much-reduced workforce. Competition
for jobs at the plant increases, and the need
for clear rules about hiring and firing goes
up.  
No financing
Meanwhile, competition for the crabs
caught by Fogo Island’s large longliner
vessels, and the inability of the
co-operative to offer them financing to
upgrade their vessels for the crab fishery
Ca
n
ad
a 
44 SAMUDRA AUGUST 2000
and the new shrimp fishery, combined
with more specific issues, has resulted in
the loss of many boats to other buyers.
Plant capacity is far higher than the raw
product available. This means less work.
The co-operative’s board of directors hit
upon a solution to both problems in its
‘preferential hiring’ policy—increase
incentives to deliver fish and crabs to the
co-operative by requiring that the spouses
or boyfriends of workers at the plants do
so, and, at the same time, have a way to
rationalize the reason for ‘calling in’ some
women and not others. 
Those made to pay the price of this
survival strategy in an increasingly
competitive environment are women
workers at Fogo Island’s fish and crab
plants. As their testimonies indicate, their
very identities, shaped by the intense,
seasonal work at the plants, gets collapsed
into those of their husbands and
boyfriends by the new policy.  No matter
that they have their own memberships,
share capital and work history, if their
‘men’ do not support the co-operative by
shipping their lobsters, fish or crabs to it,
neither do they support the co-operative
— or such is the implication of the
controversial new hiring policy. As one of
the women said, “There is no winner here.
There has been a great injustice done to the
members of the Fogo Island Co-op.”  And
as another said, “In the year 2000, this
should not be happening.”  
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This article is by Carol Penton of Joe
Batt’s Arm, Newfoundland, a
reporter for the Fogo Island Flyer, a
monthly magazine which serves
Fogo Island, and  Bonnie McCay
(mccay@aesop.rutgers.edu), who
teaches anthropology and
ecology at Rutgers University, New
Jersey, US
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Fisheries policy
Own and operate
In the year 2000, owner-operators should become the cornerstone 
of our fishery, says the Canadian Council of Professional Fish Harvesters
The Department of Fisheries andOcean (DFO)s’ decision to review itsAtlantic fishery policy is good
news for fish harvesters.  The Atlantic
Fisheries Policy Review is an ideal
opportunity to turn the spotlight on the
importance of owner-operator fleets to
our fisheries.
When the Federal Government extended
its fisheries jurisdiction to 200 nautical
miles in 1977,  it also supported an
ambitious expansion of corporate fishing
and processing capacity.  In response to
concerns in Atlantic Canada about
corporate concentration of fishing
privileges, the government developed
what became known as the ‘fleet
separation’ policy.
Under the fleet separation policy, the
government guaranteed that, in certain
fisheries, the fishing fleet would be kept
separate from fish processing operations.
In other words, fish processors would not
be allowed to own fishing licences or to
establish vertically integrated operations.
The fleet separation policy has kept
traditional inshore fisheries like the
lobster fishery in the hands of
independent owner-operators, and
ensured that the benefits of this fishery
would be shared broadly up and down the
coast.
In Atlantic Canada and Quebec, harvester
organizations also lobbied successfully
for additional protection for independent
fish harvesters by having
‘owner/operator’ clauses added to
licensing policy.  That is to say, fishing
licences could only be owned by
individuals who owned and operated
fishing vessels for their livelihood. The
owner/operator policy was designed to
keep licences from falling into the hands
of corporations, absentee investors or
‘slipper skippers’ with no attachment to
the coastal communities.
The owner/operator and fleet separation
policies are essential tools for keeping
control over access to Canada’s fishery in
the hands of small family enterprises and
sustaining the economic vibrancy of
hundreds of coastal communities. 
Unfortunately, the fleet separation and
owner/operator policies are not airtight.
Loopholes in the regulations have
allowed companies and non-harvesters to
buy up licences and quotas through
under- the-table deals.
The Canadian Council of Professional
Fish Harvesters is concerned about this
drift towards corporate concentration in
the fishery. We firmly believe that access
to licences and quotas should be strictly
reserved for owner-operators and crew
members who meet the professional
standards developed and accepted by
their peers.
We know that nearly half of today’s fish
harvesters will be retiring from the fishery
over the next 10 to 15 years. Under current
conditions, without a clear overall policy
in favour of owner-operators, a good
number of their licences could end up
under the control of the processors.
Economic backbone
That can not be allowed to happen. Small
owner-operator fishing enterprises are the
economic backbone of many coastal
communities.  The viability of these
businesses is, to a great extent, dependent
on their control over fishing licences.
These licences are part of the wealth of
these coastal communities, and must be
protected at all costs.  The future of our
communities depends on it.
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The public consultations to beundertaken by DFO as part of itsreview of the Atlantic Fishery
Policy are an excellent opportunity for fish
harvesters, municipalities, community
development organizations and
concerned individuals to put forward
clear proposals in favour of a
strengthened owner-operator fishery.
We need to eliminate the legal loopholes
in the fisheries regulations that allow fish
processors and ‘slipper skippers’ to own
and control licences and quotas.
We also need concrete measures to
encourage and support the new
generation that will enter the fishery and
take over existing owner-operator fishing
enterprises over the next 20 years.
We need solid support from the
government for professionalism so that
the new generation of fish harvesters can
meet the challenges of globalization and
an industry that is constantly having to
adapt and change.
Above all else, we need reforms guided by
a vision that makes owner-operators the
cornerstone of our fisheries.
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This piece is by Danier Bernier
(ccpfh_b@fox.nstn.ca) Executive
Director, the Canadian Council of
Professional Fish Harvesters 
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SAMUDRA editorial
Whose side are you on?
An editorial in SAMUDRA Report No. 24 on the Seattle protests 
against the World Trade Organization has elicited this spirited response
I was surprised by the editorialcomment in SAMUDRA Report  No. 24,“Sloganeering in Seattle”. There are a
number of reasons why I think the
editorial was, unusually, unfortunate. 
First, I personally found the title offensive
for those many NGOs that have prepared
for months both the forms and the
contents of the Seattle protests. In fact,
together with street demonstrations, a
host of activities had been arranged for
information sharing and strategy
planning. 
Demonstrators in Seattle were far from
limiting themselves to mere sloganeering,
but were actively networking and
educating about the huge concentration of
unaccountable decision-making power
vested in the WTO ministerial and best
expressed in the infamous ‘green room
meetings’. 
As an activist working on issues related to
the impact of the industrialization of the
fisheries and agricultural sectors in the
South, I was more than delighted to see
how committed citizens and irritated
governments from the South were able to
break the public credibility of WTO into
tiny little pieces. Just compare this to the
virtual lack of monitoring of the Uruguay
Round negotiations and the signing of the
Marrakesh agreement in 1995 and you
realize what a revolution has taken place.
Beyond a more or less fancy header,
though, my real concern is the failure of
the editorial to separate the issue of the
need for the South to access markets in the
North from the WTO—to the point that any
person unfamiliar with the ICSF could
conclude that our organization considers
the WTO to be the legitimate forum to
guarantee such an access. I think this is a
regrettable confusion.
I do not intend to list here the reasons why
many think the WTO should be scrapped.
I want, though, to focus on that issue
which, in my view, is at the very core of
the organization: the assumption that an
ever-larger area of societies’ structures
and economic activities should be
subordinated to the requirements of
international trade and traders—most of
them transnational corporations—rather
than to their genuine concerns and needs.
Should ICSF consider that fisheries—and
access to them—would be better managed
under such premises? What would then
be the role for food security, access to
resources, or the protection of the
environment? 
I can understand the concern of the
editorial about fishing communities’
access to rich markets in the North and
generating income through food
processing, but gambling for the WTO as a
mechanism to ensure such an access
would seem quite a politically naive
proposition. WTO has continually been
shaped to favour the interests of the
powerful. Look at what happened to
agricultural subsidies when agriculture
was introduced into the WTO: the formula
in place to limit agricultural subsidies for
both developed and developing countries
turns out to allow both the US and the EU
to actually increase (and even to double!)
their financial support to agro-industries.
Importance downplayed
Another aspect of the editorial that I find
worrying is the downplaying of the
importance of fish for the food security of
the poor in its quest for access to Northern
markets. Along these years, I have always
understood that the pressure of Northern
markets has resulted in a decreased access
for local, non-fishing but fish requiring,
population. This seems to have been the
case at least in Chile, India, Lake Victoria
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and now in Southeast Asia, particularly as
a result of trash fishing for shrimp
aquaculture. I might be unaware of recent
studies indicating a different trend. If this
is the case, please let me know them. 
And a word for child labour. I agreethat it is a sad reality that childrenin rural families often have to join
their parents to ensure a living for all of the
family, and I agree they need to learn their
likely future profession. My own father,
the son of a small-farmer family, helped
his parents as a child. However, in my
opinion — and if the circle of poverty is to
be broken one day — this should never
condemn those children to a lack of access
to schooling and formal education and to
the overexploitation of their working
capacity. 
It is disturbing for me to find out that
SAMUDRA seems to indicate that
“Sloganeering in Seattle”—the work of
NGOs from North and South—is against
the interests of the South, and, ultimately,
promotes ecoimperialism. I would really
appreciate a clarification on the opinion of
the editorial team, and also the views of
other readers. If you did not intend to
express an endorsement of the WTO as the
international body regulating fish trade, I
would like to see an editorial in SAMUDRA
making the point clear. If the impression I
get from the article is the right one, I
would invite ICSF members and other
SAMUDRA readers to promote an
open-ended and critical discussion on the
role of the WTO and its stand. This could
encompass an in-depth discussion about
the dialectic that arises from this editorial
comment: the competition between food
security strategies centred on
self-sufficiency and those centred on
access to international markets (the
comparative advantage approach). 
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This response comes from
Anna-Rosa Martinez i Prat,
(armartinez@grain.es), an Associate
Member of ICSF, who works with
Genetic Resources Action
International (GRAIN)
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SAMUDRA editorial
Fait accompli?
Another response to the editorial in SAMUDRA Report No. 24 
seeks to spark off a larger debate on what position to take vis-à-vis the WTO
I am very grateful to Anna Rosa forraising an alarm and highlighting anambiguity that plagues several people
regarding their positions in relation to the
World Trade Organization (WTO). 
As an individual, I do not support a
pro-WTO position. In fact, this subject was
seriously discussed at the last ICSF
Animation Team meeting in 1998. Then,
Diegus from Brazil and I took a firm
position that ICSF should be on the side of
the protestors. Diegus also categorically
stated that our secretariat should be
spending more time with the protesters’
lobby than with the ongoing deliberations
of the WTO and other UN bodies. This got
reported in the minutes of the meeting,
which all the members should have read
and responded to. But again,
unfortunately, members seem to prefer to
keep silent on such issues. 
As supporters of the inshore fishery, we
are called upon to assess the ongoing
political and economic processes that
marginalize the toiling fishworkers. This
is not merely an academic question. As
supporters of the fishworker movements,
our affinity with the actual reality of
people should help us take political
positions in their favour. Unfortunately, it
seems that the majority of us in the ICSF
probably look at the creation of the WTO as
a fait accompli and adopt a TINA (there is no
alternative) position. This either means
we are distancing ourselves from the
reality of the masses or, as an international
organization, which now has quite an
international profile, we are not free to
pursue our pro-people stand. Both of
these positions are serious and call for
immediate introspection. 
Regarding the role of the WTO, there could
be a serious lack of information. In fact, at
our last Animation Team meeting, a
couple of the members felt it wasn’t
possible to grapple with these
macro-issues when we are so totally
absorbed with the immediate
micro-issues. If this is so, there is need for
us, as a network, to appraise ourselves of
these international dynamics that affect
our daily lives, and, in the present context
of fast-changing global equations, we
should restate our positions and role as an
international support network of the
inshore fishery. 
It is also a fact that we are not infallible.
We have to learn from our mistakes. If this
SAMUDRA Report editorial kicks off a
serious debate among us, then it has
served a purpose. The test will be to see
how many of us are keen on such a debate
so that we can inform ourselves better and
are able to arrive at a decision by
consensus.  
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This response comes from Nalini
Nayak (nalinin@md5.vsnl.net.in),
co-ordinator, Animation Team, ICSF
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Fishery co-operatives-6
Never lose your cool
The sixth instalment on the pioneer of Japan’s co-operative 
movement talks of dealing with the military at the end of World War II
By the end of 1944, the Japanesearmy was suffering great defeats inthe South Pacific, but the military
government controlled the media and did
not allow the public to hear any such
information.  The army, in their
desperation, made certain absurd
demands, and I would here like to relate
how I responded to such demands.
A certain operation official—whom I will
call K and who was with the Akatsuki
Regiment stationed in Otaru—paid me a
visit and requested that we co-operate in
the defense of northern Japan against
possible invasion. He informed me that in
order to perform the defense operation,
they needed fuel for cargo ships, but that
the army had a severe shortage of oil. They
had planned to use herring oil instead,
and asked me if we would send them
fishing boats to catch herring.
Herring oil was obtained from herring
which migrated through the Sea of
Okhotsk. I was sure that we would not be
able to produce enough oil to support a
military operation. I rejected his request,
telling him that our primary responsibility
was to fulfil the production quota for food
for the citizens. He became angry and left.
A few days later, the chief of the Hokkaido
government’s Fishery Department
informed me that we had to send 200 boats
and their crews, which were fishing for
mackerel around Matsumae near
Hakodate, to the Sea of Okhotsk, where
they were to be used to catch herring. The
official implied that the military would
force the government to replace me if I
didn’t agree.
Since nobody was in any position to
disobey an order from the army at that
time, we were obliged to obey this order.
I tried to resist as long as I could, so that
the fishermen would suffer as little as
possible. For instance, when I negotiated
with the Akatsuki Regiment regarding
this matter, I persuaded K to accept two
conditions. The first was that the regiment
would supply the fuel for the trip from
Matsumae to the Sea of Okhotsk and back,
and the second was that they must
compensate the fishermen for the lost
catches of mackerel, based on the average
catch. K approved the requests and we
concluded a formal agreement.
Two hundred fishing boats then gathered
in the Sea of Okhotsk. I suggested that a
trial operation be carried out first with
only 20 boats, since we would, therefore,
be able to conserve fuel and determine the
potential amount to be harvested. The
results were very unpromising, as only a
small amount of herring was caught.
Soon after the operation began, World
War II came to an end, on 15 August 1945.
The Akatsuki Regiment’s operation
turned out to be a pointless venture, and
the fishermen came back home. I was
concerned about how to compensate
them, so I went to Otaru, accompanied by
an official of the Hokkaido government, to
meet the leader of the regiment. To my
surprise, however, the Akatsuki
commander claimed to know nothing of
the contract between us, and he flatly
rejected our claim.
Large-scale operation
I responded that, as commander, he must
surely have known about the operation,
particularly since it has been such a
large-scale operation and since K had been
sent directly to us. The commander, who
seemed to be shocked by Japan’s defeat,
rattled his sword and once again denied
any knowledge of the operation. He then
asked who was responsible for Japan’s
defeat, and answered his own question by
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asserting that we, the civilian leaders,
were responsible because we had not
co-operated.
He then stopped and asked theabsurd question, “Do you haveany calluses on your hands?” He
implied that civilians had not fought
bravely for the good of the nation. I was
rather unnerved by his rattling of his
sword, but he did not seem to be an
ill-natured man. I calmly replied that I had
no calluses, since my job involved holding
a pen, not a sword.
He regained his composure and asked
what had happened with the operation. I
explained about the contract documents I
had made with K of the operation staff,
and told him how K had not sent them
back to me.
The commander called a lieutenant and
asked him who had made the contract.
The lieutenant replied that K had, but that
he had torn it up when the war ended. The
commander became furious, as did
another official, a colonel who had come
into the room and heard the story.  
The latter said he wanted to kill K and end
his own life by committing seppuki. (Many
military leaders, who came from the
samurai class, felt responsible for Japan’s
defeat, and, therefore, committed suicide
by seppuki after the war. seppuki involves
ritual disembowelment, and this practice
was originally carried out by samurai who
had dishonoured their superiors.)
I came to understand that the commander
truly had not known about the contract,
due to a communications breakdown, but
that was not our business. As I was afraid
that our claim would be passed on to be
handled by the army, I requested the
commander that at least five million yen
be paid to the 200 fishermen of Matsumae
to settle this affair in a businesslike
manner.
The commander then reprimanded the
colonel by telling him that there was no
point in crying over spilt milk. He said he
would honour the claim for five million
yen, but that they had no money at that
time. He suggested we take payment in
the form of goods, such as fishing nets and
rope, instead of cash. I was surprised to
hear that they had secret supplies of such
goods stored in warehouses.
Cash payment
I asked about the value of this gear, and
found that it was six times as expensive as
the regular prices. We would receive only
a limited amount of gear to cover our
losses, so I insisted on cash. The
commander finally told me to wait for a
few days, while he tried to get the money
from the Hokkaido headquarters of the
army. When I returned to his office a few
days later, I was told that he had obtained
the money. I thanked him for his efforts,
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and went to Matsumae, where I began
distributing it. Some of the fishermen
claimed at first that the amount was too
small, but they understood after I told
them about the negotiations I had to go
through in order to get the money.
That was over 30 years ago, but I canstill vividly remember thecommander. He was quite
arrogant on the surface, but, at heart, he
was an honest person. If I had not
negotiated bravely, the Matsumae
fishermen would not have received the
money, and they would have suffered
through extremely hard times after the
war.
As a point of interest, I’d like to note that
the Akatsuki Regiment did not consist of
battle troops. It was in charge of procuring
goods which the army needed. They had
numerous warehouses in Sapporo
stocked with goods such as clothes and
shoes. In the post-war confusion, some
soldiers took advantage of the lack of
discipline and began to sell these goods on
the black market. There were many
rumours about such activity, but nobody
made any accusations, as everyone was
frightened of the army.
I, therefore, went to see Hokkaido
Governor Kato and advised him to look
into this matter. I told him that these
goods, which were purchased with tax
money, did not belong to the Akatsuki
Regiment anymore, since the war was
over. With the severe shortages of food,
clothing, and other goods, I told him, the
soldiers should not be allowed to engage
in such illegal behaviour. I suggested that
the Hokkaido government take control of
these provisions.
I also told him that, in certain regions,
army officials had been selling trucks and
keeping the money for themselves. I
recommended that the government
distribute these trucks to the agricultural
and fisheries organizations, as they would
then be of great help to ensure a stable
supply of food for the people.
At that time, Governor Kato was not the
head of the Hokkaido government, since
the military government had placed a
president in power over him during the
war. Nevertheless, the governor reacted
quickly by proposing to the Prefectural
Assembly that these goods be placed
under civilian control. This policy had a
great effect in preventing chaos from
breaking out. In particular, ten regional
branches of Dogyoren received trucks,
greatly facilitating the distribution of
food.
I hope it does not appear as if I am
boasting. I simply hope to make clear that
we must never lose our cool, and that, if
we are brave, we will be sure to find strong
supporters who will co-operate with us.
 
Japan
This is excerpted from the
Autobiography of Takatoshi Ando,
translated by Naoyuki Tao and
James Colyn
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Supertrawler ahoy!
The world’s
biggest-capacity
fishing ship has just
been launched.
Atlantic Dawn, 144
metres long and
sporting a 24.3 metre
beam, is a midwater
trawl and
purse-seiner that
belongs to Irish
skipper and
businessman Kevi
McHugh of Atlantic
Dawn Ltd.
The supertrawler cost
US$65 million and
was built by the
Umoe Sterkoder
shipyard in Norway.
Atlantic Dawn is the
biggest and most
powerful in a trio of
140-metre plus
new-generation
pelagic freezer stern
trawlers being put
into service this year.
The other two, from
Spanish shipyards,
are for Dutch owners.
Atlantic Dawn is
expected to catch
sardinella, mackerel
and horse mackerel
in West African
waters, starting off
Mauritiania, fishing
under the new
European Union
fishing arrangements. 
The supertrawler has
a freezing capacity of
about 350 tonnes per
day and can carry
around 7,000 tonnes
of fish.
Far too many
Overcapacity is still
the main problem
facing the European
Union’s fishing
industry, says the EU
fisheries
commissoner Franz
Fischler. His
comments came in
the wake of the
announcement of a
Green Paper which
discusses options for
the future of a
sustainable Common
Fisheries Policy (CFP),
reports Fishing News
International.
Fischler said that EU
fleet reduction
programmes have
not proven
sufficiently effective
in tackling “this
scourge of most
fishing industries.”
He also expressed
concern at the
weakness of the
implementation of
CFP measures in the
Mediterranean.
Hot Chile
The European Union
(EU) has said it will
demand a process of
consultation in the
World Trade
Organization (WTO)
to resolve the
differences caused by
the ban that Chile
has imposed on the
use of its ports to
unload the catches
made by the
community’s
industrial fleet on the
high seas. 
The decision comes
on the heels of a
study which, Brussels
says, proved that the
Chilean measures
were incompatible
with the policies of
the multilateral
organization. The
Chilean government
defended its position
on the grounds of
marine resource
conservation in the
framework of the
Law of the Sea.
The EU’s high-seas
fleet has caused the
overexploitation of
the swordfish fishery,
a species which is
both highly
trans-zonal and
highly migratory.
This has badly
affected the Chilean
artisanal fisheries
sector. EU officials say
the aim is to remove
the restrictions in
force since 1991,
which prevent
vessels, mainly
Spanish, from
trans-shipping
swordfish catches in
Chilean ports. The EU
argues that
environmental
concerns in a
commercial context
must be resolved
multilaterally, and
not through arbitrary
or discriminatory
unilateral measures.  
Pushed out
Trang’s provincial
fishery office in
Thailand has
launched a
programme to
encourage push-net
fishermen to use less
destructive and more
environmentally
friendly fishing gear,
reports the Bangkok
Post. 
Provincial fishery
chief Suporn
Suthanurak said he
hoped all the
province’s 150
push-nets would be
gone by the year’s
end. He would not
say what cash
incentives the
fishermen would be
offered, but said the
authorities would not
enforce harsh
measures.
Environmentalists,
however, have said
that fishermen who
maintained sound
practices were being
unfairly treated. Pisit
Charnsnoh chairman
of Yadfon
Association, said
News Round-up
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push-nets should be
banned
unconditionally. He
said the money
should go to activities
which improve the
ecological balance,
such as mangrove
reforestation and
education. 
Pesky for the fish
Pescanova, the
multinational fishing
and processing giant
based in Spain, has
become the world’s
largest fishing vessel
operator, following
its acquisition of a
majority
shareholding in
financially troubled
Pescafina.
Pescanova, which has
operations
worldwide,  is now
said to corner a 65
per cent share of the
Spanish frozen food
market. Pescafina,
which was fishing on
quotas in Iran,
Namibia and Cuba,
fell into financial
difficulties over two
years ago when a
joint venture partner
went bankrupt. It
reportedly owed
15,000 million pesetas
to 20 banks.
New worry?
A new deal renewing
the Euro-Ivorian
fisheries agreement
between the
European
Commission and the
Ivory Coast will
allow an increased
number of EU vessels
to fish for tuna off the
Ivory Coast. The
permitted tonnage,
however, will remain
at 8,500 a year.
The agreement,
which lasts until June
2003, also features a
high level — 71.3 per
cent — of EU financial
compensation to the
Ivory Coast. This will
be used to promote
scientific and
technical
programmes, and
monitoring and
control. The previous
agreement had only
20 per cent as
financial
compensation. 
Go, Goa, gone
A High Court at
Panaji, Goa, India
recently put its foot
down on violations of
its trawl ban order. It
suspended the
licences of all
trawlers registered
with the Fisheries
Department of the
Goa government,
sealed the use of the
seven official jetties
by the trawlers for
unloading their fish
catch, and directed
the Goa government
to publicize its order
in the newspapers so
that the public is
made aware that
there exists a ban on
all mechanized
fishing activities till
15 August.
Earlier, a local citizen
had written a letter to
the High Court
complaining that the
government had
reduced the ban on
fishing in the State of
Goa from 90 days to
54 days during the
monsoon period,
despite full
knowledge that this
was the breeding
period for the
economically
important varieties of
fish including
mackerel and
sardines.
The petitioner
pleaded that such
indiscriminate fishing
would impact
negatively on fish
stocks and this would
affect his right to life
guaranteed under
Article 21 of the
Constitution of India.
He also stated that
fish protein is the
principal staple food
of the coastal
population of Goa.
Traditional fishermen
would also be
deprived of their
livelihood.
The High Court
converted the letter
into a Public Interest
Litigation (PIL)and
directed the Goa
government
including the Chief
Secretary, the
Director of Fisheries
and the country’s
premier ocean
research institution,
the National Institute
of Oceanography
(NIO), to file
affidavits. The Goa
Government was
unable to produce
any documentation in
support of  its
decision to reduce the
ban from 90 days to
54 days.
The NIO, however,
filed a fairly detailed
affidavit in which it
informed the court
that it was of the
opinion that the ban
on the fishing season
from 1 June to 31
August could offer a
degree of protection
to several varieties of
fish including
mackerel and
sardines. 
A mega event
The World Forum of
Fish Harvesters and
Fish Workers (WFF)
will hold its
Constituent
Assembly from 2 to 6
October 2000 in
Loctudy, France,
when it will be
formally giving itself
a constitution.
The three-year old
WFF was founded on
21 November 1997 at
a meeting in New
Delhi, when
representatives of
small-scale fish
harvesters from Asia,
Africa, South
America and North
America came
together to battle the
reckless plunder of
the seas by the
world’s large
industrialized fleets.
WFF has a registered
membership of 28
fishworkers/
harvesters’
organizations. 
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,Empty Nets
(jet up in the morning} at a quarter to four
'Iry not to maR!- mruh noise, as yougo to tlie aoor
Jump in tIie 60at, you can liear tIieguffs roar
!'It tlie start ofa 6rananew aay
;rire up tlie engine, you're reaay wgo
1feaaout tlie finr60ur, you aon't want to 6e dow
'What's out tliere toaay
'We!' you never k!ww
Just finpe tfint it turns out O:7(
'1Iut it's empty nets
'l1tat's wliat liegets
'Wlien you're out on tlie water
9{p time for regrets
'l1iose empty nets
'l1tat's wfint liegets
1fow's tlie poorfislierman to payoff IUs ae6ts
'Wlien liegoes out etuft morning
'To finuf in tIie nets
- from the album Tmpty 'N?ts by Jim Payne
LICSF Is an Intemalional NGO
wor1<ing on issues thai concern
fishworlters the woJ1d over. It is
in slalus with the Economic and
Social Council 01 the UN and Is
on IlO's Special Ust of Non·
Governmental International
Organizations. II also has
liaison Status Wllh FAD.
Registered In Geneva. ICSF
has olliees In Channal, India
and Srussels, Belgium. As a
global network DI commullity
organ Izers, leache rs,
lechnicians. researdlers and
scientists, ICSF'S activities
encompau mOnitOring and
research, exchange and
_._""'-
as we. as communICations.
SAt.lUDRA REPORT invites
conttiblJhons and responses.
Correspondence should be
addlessed to Ihe Cllennal
_.
The opuuons and POSlbo/lS
expressed In the al1lCleS Ire
Ihose of Ihllldlors e:tr'lCefIWIlI
and do nol necesslrily
lepresefllhIl oIIiaaI 'o'I8WS 01
ICSF.
SAMUDAA REPORT can now
be ac:c:essed on ICSF'S hon'e
pageon \heWM:IWide Webat
Iql:llwww.ksl.net
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